Chapter One

I

'We have in East Africa', declared Sir Charles Eliot, the former Commissioner of the East African Protectorate, shortly after his inglorious departure from that territory (which did not become Kenya until 1920), 'the rare experience of dealing with a *tabula rasa*'. He stressed, in this propitious context, the transformative potential of British colonialism, and above all of White settlement, which he hoped, would lead a civilising assault on what he imagined to be the untamed nature of the region's 'deserts, marshes or jungles', not only in what he planned to make the 'White man's country' of the Protectorate, but from there across the wider region. Such an effort, he noted in passing, was a 'nobler and more profitable struggle than the international quarrels which waste the brain and blood of Europe and Asia'. 'Whatever East Africa is in ten years' time', he opined, 'will be the result not of circumstances or of things beyond our control, but simply of what we do now'. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the British people to steel themselves to develop the region, all the more so given the public money already spent on the recently completed Ugandan railway. '[H]ecatombs of lives', wrote the old classicist, would support orthodox finance.[1]

The transformation Eliot envisaged was never brought into being, however. The colonial power never showed the constancy of purpose he hoped, nor, indeed, was East Africa the blank slate he imagined or the wider global economic and political context as under British control as he implied. The impact of colonialism, rather, was uneven and uncertain. Nonetheless, it brought in its wake significant social and economic change. This chapter sketches the impact of those changes, from the early, linked, efforts of the colonial state to create an effective administration and establish and maintain an economic base in increasingly difficult global circumstances, to the late colonial

[1] C. Eliot, *The East African Protectorate* (London, 1966), pp.1-5.

drive to expand production to aid the fight for imperial survival and then recovery, in a time of rising commodity prices, efforts made in the shadow of deepening official concerns about their impact on the land. As markets in produce and labour widened, towns burgeoned, and increasingly heavy burdens were placed on people in an effort to save the soil, in different combinations in different places, by the late 1940s always disputed moral economies, and the relationships of class, gender and generation which they governed, were everywhere felt to be in a particularly rapid flux. Disruption appeared to rule. This was the background against which historically novel visions of community were imagined.

II

In 1891 and 1895 respectively, the German and British governments took formal responsibility for their spheres of influence in East Africa from what had proved to be the unviable private imperialisms of the *Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft* (DOAG) and the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC).[2] Like these failed sub-imperialists, British and German administrators sought to establish themselves on the coast before following inland routes pioneered by Swahili trading caravans - earlier in the German sphere, later in the British sphere - searching for, first, ivory, and subsequently slaves, movements which had opened up in the interior opportunities in the ivory trade, and in the expanding markets they created in foodstuffs, but also posed dangers, most notably in what was to become Tanganyika, where the decline of the long-distance ivory trade, following the decimation of the local elephant population, created political conflict.[3]

Beginning from the 'stations' they established along these trade routes ('with rare exceptions', according to Eliot, consisting 'of a single European officer', reluctant in his isolation to leave the station, 'with a small military detachment' of perhaps 'fifteen to thirty men… and a few police'[4]), Europe's 'little conquests'[5] began as intensely local, and minimally demanding, alliances, made, albeit under the shadow of their ultimate resort to external force, by the weak Europeans, designed to ensure the security of the roads and the availability of food supplies.[6] In this developing

[2] Iliffe, *Modern History*, pp.97-8. J. Lonsdale, 'The Conquest State of Kenya', in B. Berman and J. Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa* (London, 1992), pp.15-16. J. Darwin, *The Empire Project* (Cambridge, 2009), pp.128-9.
[3] Iliffe, *Modern History*, Ch.3. C.H. Ambler, *Kenyan Communities in the Age of Imperialism: The Central Region in the Late Nineteenth Century* (London, 1988), p.105. Lonsdale, 'Conquest State', pp.21-2.
[4] G.H. Mungeam, *Kenya: Select Historical Documents, 1884-1923* (Nairobi, 1978), p.87.
[5] J. Lonsdale, 'East Africa' in J.M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis, (eds.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century* (Oxford, 1999), p.532.
[6] Iliffe, *Modern History*, pp.116-7. Ambler, *Kenyan Communities*, pp.105-6. D.M. Anderson, *Eroding the Commons: The Politics of Ecology in Baringo, Kenya, 1890s-1963* (Oxford, 2002), pp.44-5. Hunter, 'Languages of Politics', pp.25-6. J. Lonsdale 'The Politics of Conquest in Western Kenya, 1894-1903', in B. Berman and J. Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa* (London, 1992), p.54.

stage of European rule, power was shared, always uneasily, with African allies, and alliances were a source of African accumulation as much as European security.[7]

Often, in the first instance, these alliances were made with 'big men' along the trade routes, brokers who owed their position to their earlier successful handling of the long-distance trade, and who had converted this economic control into a degree of political power. These men continued to provide food supplies while using their alliance with the Europeans to pursue their own factional concerns.[8] More generally, the Europeans offered a potentially profitable source of patronage. In what became central Kenya, for example, the British, under tight Treasury control and seeking a cheap and reliable military force, came to terms with sections of the pastoral people the British called Masai. For some, alliance offered the prospect of decisive external support in sectional succession disputes. For others, Europeans were a source of 'outdoor famine relief' in a period marked by a series of setbacks before the arrival of the British, setbacks worsened by the devastating loss of herds and food sources to European-borne diseases in the decade after the mid-1880s, a time remembered locally as 'When the Cattle Died' or simply 'The Disaster'. In the mid-1890s, the British appeared to be the most fertile available patrons, the means by which Masai could rebuild their decimated herds and re-establish a respectable pastoralist life. Sections of Masai, therefore, flocked to British stations in large numbers.[9]

Patronage and violence were intimately entwined. From their bases along the established trade routes, the Europeans launched what the British called 'punitive expeditions', campaigns targeted primarily at animals and crops rather than life, initially against groups seen to threaten the movement of traffic, often following the carefully self-interested advice of their new allies who were themselves engaged in competition for opportunity and advantage. Successful expeditions, broadly, resulted in the bringing under British patronage of those formerly thought to be hostile.[10] The spoils

[7] On misunderstanding and unease see G. Muriuki, *A History of the Kikuyu, 1500-1900* (Nairobi, 1974), Ch.6.
[8] Lonsdale, 'Conquest State', pp.26-7.
[9] R. Waller, 'The Masai and the British, 1895-1905: The Origins of an Alliance', *Journal of African History*, Vol.17, No.4, (1976), pp.529-53. Lonsdale, 'Conquest State', p.25.
[10] Lonsdale, 'Conquest State', pp.29-30.

of these raids were shared between the Europeans and their African allies, an indication of the division of power at this point, with the bulk typically being taken by African 'auxiliaries', as in the earliest expeditions in what became North Kavirondo, where such 'friendlies' took around 75% of looted cattle.[11] This was not, however, to last.

Security concerns combined with the growing need of the Europeans for a sustainable economic base, led to a shift in the character of these relationships from around the turn of the century. In the first place, alliances, initially advantageous, could prove costly – on both sides. There was often a contradiction between African and European interests, between accumulation and security, which put a strain on alliances: local sub-imperialisms or competitive quests for opportunity could threaten local peaces, perpetuating the insecurity the Europeans had contracted them to end.[12] In the south-east of the German territory, for example, the battle for opportunity and advantage generated by the German presence led some, initially welcoming of new external allies, to turn against their German patrons, and the sub-imperialisms of coastal elites, and to take part in the *Maji Maji* rebellion in 1905 as they sought to maintain what they had wrought or to carve out more.[13] For the waring Masai, the British first aided their efforts at accumulation and then, after 1900, hindered them, as the diverging attitudes of the allies to uncontrolled stock raiding stretched the alliance to breaking point.[14]

At the same time, these local skirmishes, cheap by European standards, nonetheless, amounted to a significant cost.[15] In the first nine years of its life, the military consumed around one third of the East African Protectorate's budget, a burden that was very largely responsible for the

[11] Lonsdale, 'Conquest State', p.32. Lonsdale 'Politics of Conquest', pp.66-7. Iliffe, *Modern History*, p.117.
[12] Iliffe, *Modern History*, pp.120-1. Waller, 'Masai and the British', pp.539-40. Anderson, *Eroding the Commons*, pp.42-3.
[13] F. Becker, 'Traders, "Big Men" and Prophets: Political Continuity and Crisis in the *Maji Maji* Rebellion in Southeast Tanzania', *Journal of African History*, Vol.45, No.1, (2004), pp. 14-9.
[14] Waller, 'Masai and the British', pp.542-9.
[15] J. Koponen, *Development for Exploitation: German Colonial Policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884-1914* (Helsinki, 1994), pp.134-5.

tripling of the Imperial subsidy granted to the Protectorate in the half decade after 1896.[16] In that territory, these concerns were only added to by the huge costs associated with the railway that was constructed to link the coast to Lake Victoria, designed to open up the 'Ugandan pearl'. Begun in 1895, funded by Treasury loans, and eventually reaching the lake, at a cost of £5.5m (about £500m today) and long after expected, in 1901, the railway was a financial millstone, eating up £320,000 per annum in sinking fund and interest payments, the target of merciless criticism in the House of Commons.[17]

As concerns grew about the funding of these imperial adventures, it became increasingly obvious to officials that a self-financing administration could only be built upon effective control.[18] The period from roughly the turn of the century came to be marked, therefore, by new European demands, changes in the nature of the relationship between Africans and Europeans, the extension of the areas under European influence, and the search for a local economic base.

The most obvious symbol of this shift, and the basis of a self-financing administration, was the introduction of hut taxes, in 1898 in German East Africa and in 1902 in the East African Protectorate.[19] Reflecting, in 1901, on the relationship between administration and tax collection, Sir Charles Eliot contrasted the 'periodically heavy expenditure for military expeditions' incurred by the British, with the benefits of 'a continuous and steady [British] presence', and remarked that 'financially this want of control over the natives means that we are unable to collect any direct taxes.' The neighbouring German sphere, as well as the British administration in Uganda, he suggested, should stand as examples to the Protectorate: 'If the Germans can levy a hut tax', he insisted, 'I see no reason why, with adequate machinery[,] we should not be able to collect a like sum.'[20] War was a costly burden borne by the imperial government; the establishment of effective

[16] B. Berman and J. Lonsdale, 'Coping with Contradictions: The Development of the Colonial State, 1895-1914', in B. Berman and J. Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa* (London, 1992), p.86. M.P.K. Sorrenson, *Origins of European Settlement in Kenya* (London, 1968), p.30.
[17] Sorrenson, *Origins*, pp.19-20, p.30.
[18] Lonsdale, 'Conquest State', p.19.
[19] Iliffe, *Modern History*, pp.133-4. Lonsdale, 'Conquest State', p.32.
[20] Mungeam, *Documents*, pp.87-8.

administration would both avoid those costs and allow for the collection of local taxation, which would, in turn, fund the administration.

In their effort to achieve this, the European powers were aided by the expansion of their patronage networks in the previous decade. As they gathered allies to themselves, not only did their self-confidence increase, but the value of individual allies was reduced.[21] 'Allies' could thus be converted, sometimes painfully, into 'agents', a move reflected in the changing distribution of the spoils of punitive expeditions and the nature of the forces that carried them out. From participating under African control and taking the lion's share of the loot in the early years of the British presence, on the final punitive expeditions undertaken in northern Kavirondo in 1903, African auxiliaries were replaced by uniformed African soldiers and policemen, soldiers and policemen paid and organised directly by the British, and a mere 3% of the confiscated stock was redistributed to African 'friendlies'.[22]

The European need to collect taxes, and ensure that this imposition could not be evaded, also led them to seek to extend their presence into areas more distant from the trade routes.[23] Highlighting the interconnection of wider control and taxation, a German District Officer wrote from the Western Plateaux of German East Africa in 1903 of 'the agriculturally most productive, taxable Nyamwezi', who lived in the valleys and who were 'incessantly harassed by' their antithesis, 'the wholly unproductive Sandawe'.[24] In attempting to bring these areas to heel, the Europeans were often ruthless.[25] In the Gusii highlands, for example, an area well to the south of the old caravan route and only really of interest to the British after 1902, more than one hundred men were left dead in the course of a single punitive expedition launched in 1908, while 548 Ha people were killed

[21] Waller, 'Masai and the British', p.548. Iliffe, *Modern History*, pp.119-21.
[22] Lonsdale, 'Conquest State', pp.31-2. Lonsdale, 'Politics of Conquest', p.71.
[23] Londale, 'Conquest State', p.32. Ambler, *Kenyan Communities*, p.108.
[24] Cited in Iliffe, *Modern History*, p.118.
[25] Iliffe, *Modern History*, p.116.

in 1911 as the Germans made efforts to enforce tax collection in the area, before eventually deciding that the likely returns were not immediately worth the effort.[26]

As the European powers embarked on this gradual process of establishing control, they required a workable administrative framework and, given their meagre resources, a cheap one, 'hegemony on a shoestring'.[27] In both, this meant that even as the terms of the interaction changed, the British and German administrations continued to depend upon African 'collaborators' to uphold their rule.[28]

By 1914, German East Africa had been divided into twenty-two districts. Two of these, Iringa and Mahenge in the south, continued to be ruled by soldiers, the legacy of *Maji Maji*. The rest were administered by civilian European district officers (many with a military background), each directly responsible to, and therefore a direct burden upon, the central administration in Dar es Salaam. Resplendent in white, these officers held court each week at district *barazas*. Below them, the structure of authority relied on local men, but varied in nature from area to area, in places, most notably on the coast, but also in a few inland districts, relying on *makida*, the educated products of the central schooling system established to mould a local civil service and often, but not always, outsiders in the district; and in other places on people the Europeans referred to as 'chiefs'.[29]

By the time the young Sidney Fazan arrived on the coast of the Protectorate in 1911, the 'pioneer days had', similarly, 'ended'. 'The country', he noted, had been 'mapped into provinces and districts', linking the new capital of Nairobi to the localities, 'and effective administration had been

[26] R.M. Maxon, *Conflict and Accommodation in Western Kenya* (London, 1989), Ch.2. Iliffe, *Modern History*, p.118.
[27] S. Berry, 'Hegemony on a Shoestring: Indirect Rule and Access to Agricultural Land', *Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol.62, No.3, (1992), pp.327-55.
[28] Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, p.117, pp.134-5. J. Lonsdale, 'Have Tropical Africa's Nationalisms Continued Imperialism's World Revolution by Other Means?', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 21, No.4, (2015), p.612.
[29] Iliffe, *Modern History*, pp.118-9, 209-10. Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, pp.117-29. J-G. Deutsch, 'Celebrating Power in Everyday Life: The Administration of Law and the Public Sphere in Colonial Tanzania, 1890-1914', *Journal of African Cultural Studies*, Vol.15, No.1, (2002), pp.93-103. Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, p.132. M. Wright, 'Local Roots of Policy in German East Africa', *Journal of African History*, Vol.9, No.4, (1968), p.625. J. Willis, 'The Administration of Bonde, 1920-1960. A Study of the Implementation of Indirect Rule in Tanganyika; *African Affairs*, Vol.92, No.366, (1993), pp.55-6. Hunter, 'Languages of Politics', pp.24-9.

established', now increasingly run by men, like Fazan, 'fresh and raw from Oxford and Cambridge', replacements for the more rough and ready officers, 'the human detritus of European imperialism', as Bruce Berman has called them, the state had inherited from the IBEAC.[30]

The bottom of the administrative pyramid, drawing on a model pioneered by Lord Lugard (an old company man himself) in Northern Nigeria, was organised on the basis of 'indirect rule', in theory, the incorporation of traditional African 'tribal' political systems into a single system of colonial administration, the effort on the part of the British to rule their new subjects through their own leaders and according to their own laws and customs, 'purified in so far as is necessary', a course dictated as much by prudence as economy.[31] As Sir Percy Girouard, the Governor of the Protectorate at the time of Fazan's arrival, and a man with experience in Lugard's Nigeria, wrote in May 1910, 'direct rule' by Europeans simply did not seem feasible. 'If we [Europeans] allow the tribal authority to be ignored or broken', he argued, 'we, who numerically form a small minority… shall be obliged to deal with a rabble'.[32] To this end, a series of Native Authority Ordinances were issued between 1902 and 1912, which allowed for the appointment of 'headmen' or chiefs, and charged those figures with responsibility for tax collection and the maintenance of law and order, supported by newly constituted 'native courts'.[33]

By the time the British took control of what they called Tanganyika from the defeated Germans, supervised by the League of Nations, at the end of the First World War, indirect rule had been elevated to the status of a doctrine and adopted across Britain's African territories.[34] It inevitably followed that, under another man with experience in Nigeria, Sir Donald Cameron, similar steps were taken to identify and incorporate 'traditional' authorities into the administrative system,

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[30] S.H. Fazan, *Colonial Kenya Observed: British Rule, Mau Mau and the Wind of Change* (London, 2015), p.27. B. Berman, 'Structure and Process in the Bureaucratic States of Colonial Africa', in B. Berman and J. Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa* (London, 1992), p.156.
[31] Mungeam, *Documents*, p.103.
[32] Mungeam, *Documents*, p.103. J. Darwin, *Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain* (London, 2012), p.220.
[33] Berry, 'Hegemony on a Shoestring', pp.333-5. Lord Hailey, *An African Survey: Revised 1956* (London, 1957), p.446, p.450. Mungeam, *Documents*, pp.92-3, p.113.
[34] Berry, 'Hegemony of a Shoestring', p.332.

accompanied by much self-regarding grumbling that their German predecessors had deliberately destroyed indigenous African systems of government.[35]

Despite its apparently traditional basis, the ideology of indirect rule was impervious neither to contest nor change in the interests of efficient administration. The British, for example, well-understood that chiefs had not existed in most of the East African Protectorate before their arrival, and defended their use on grounds of utility.[36] Where those elevated to such positions proved to be incompetent agents of British power, moreover, they were removed, as the first generation of colonial chiefs in Kiambu found to their cost between 1908 and 1912.[37] Both central administrations and field officers across the region, furthermore, proved themselves willing to innovate in the interests of administrative efficiency. In Kenya (as it by then was), for example, Local Native Councils were established in 1925 to advise Native Authorities, and to co-opt and provide an outlet for the 'mischievous tendencies' of 'progressive' local opinion.[38] And in Bonde, in northern Tanganyika, the conversion to indirect rule was actively resisted by local administrators on precisely grounds of efficiency. In an area into which there was significant migration of people seeking work on the local sisal estates, local administrators fought Dar es Salaam to maintain a form of direct rule throughout the inter-war period (an indication of the room for manoeuvre local officials still held), fearing that Native Authorities would be incapable of maintaining law and order.[39]

'Had William the Conqueror been possessed of maxim guns, typewriters and a few modern inventions', wrote Charles Temple, one of Lugard's Nigerian lieutenants, complacently, 'he would have occupied Britain with diminutive force… [and] established a bureaucratic form of government with a few District Commissioners scattered over the land.'[40] Temple, however, vastly overestimated the slickness of British rule. While 'the potent bureaucratic agent of imperialism' had by direct and

[35] Iliffe, *Modern History*, pp.322-3. Hailey, *Survey*, pp.472-5. Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, pp.135-6.
[36] Hailey, *Survey*, p.446. B. Berman, *Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination* (Oxford, 1990), p.54. M.S. Clough, *Fighting Two Sides: Kenyan Chiefs and Politicians, 1918-1940* (Niwot, 1990), p.13.
[37] Clough, *Fighting Two Sides*, p.17.
[38] Berman, *Control and Crisis*, p.216.
[39] Willis, 'The Administration of Bonde', pp.53-67.
[40] Cited in Darwin, *Unfinished Empire*, pp.220-1.

indirect pressures 'smashed the self-sufficiency of indigenous pre-capitalist societies', it was at the same time hampered by lack of information, poor communication and the fact that power could only be exercised by giving some of it away: in relying on Africans to exercise authority, the Europeans became, to a degree, subject to that authority. European rule was, therefore, simultaneously strong and weak. [41] Nonetheless, in the first decade of the twentieth century African and European co-existence gradually gave way to an imperfect European control. Self-sufficiency, though, required not only effective administration, but a local economic base. This need was the origin of the immigrant presence in both territories. While it was held that Africans had a role in generating revenue, as we shall see, a 'conceptual blindness based on racism' led administrators to assume that they were at best unlikely to and at worst incapable of providing the central engine of the economic growth which would pay for the colonial presence.[42] In turn, these incomers had to be incorporated into the administrative system.

In the East African Protectorate, the need to make the new railway pay – 'that fundamental and recurring problem of East African finance'[43] - led Sir Charles Eliot, having flirted with a range of possibilities, to take the decision in 1902 to invite white settlers (people '[q]uick to anger, inhospitable, aloof, boorish and insensitive', in J.M. Kariuki's memorable words[44]) into the territory, a move which the construction of the railway itself had made possible.[45] Slow at first, the pace of settlement, from South Africa as well as Britain, gradually picked up, and with it the alienation of land. By the outbreak of the Second World War, settler numbers had reached 23,000.[46]

The origins of white settlement in Tanganyika were somewhat different. Needing, like their British counterparts, an economic basis for their rule, the German authorities granted concessions to

[41] Berman, 'Structure and Process', pp.140-62. Spear, 'Neo-traditionalism', p.9. Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, pp.129-30.
[42] L. Larson, 'The Ngindo: Exploring the Centre of the Maji Maji Rebellion', in J. Giblin and J. Monson, (eds.), *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War* (Leiden, 2010), p.103.
[43] Eliot, *Protectorate*, p.188.
[44] J.M. Kariuki, *Mau Mau Detainee* (London, 1964), p.41.
[45] Sorrenson, *Origins*, pp.17-39.
[46] A. Smith, 'The Immigrant Communities: The Europeans', in D.A. Low and A. Smith, (eds.), *History of East Africa* Vol.III (Oxford, 1976), p.450. A. Clayton and D.C. Savage, *Government and Labour in Kenya, 1895-63* (London, 1974), pp.20-1.

company-managed plantations from their arrival in 1891 which brought with them a few white managers. Successive administrations remained somewhat agnostic about the value of white settlement, and offered little official encouragement to potential settlers, but nonetheless, allowed such people to arrive - from Greece, Italy and South Africa, as well as Germany. In the decade before the outbreak of the First World War, the number of Europeans in German East Africa jumped from 1,390 to 4,998.[47] The expulsion of German nationals by the British during the First World War, part of an effort to destroy the German presence, significantly reduced this population, but after normal relations were re-established between Britain and Germany in 1925 many returned, and, as the new administration was keen to balance the German presence with equal British numbers, the European population of the territory grew across the 1920s, from a low of 2,500 at the end of the war to 9,000 by the 1930s.[48]

In both territories, these incomers sought political influence and the respective administrations sought to co-opt white opinion as a means of heading off political difficulties.[49] To this end, after responsibility for the East African Protectorate was transferred from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office in 1905, the well-worn machinery of a 'Crown Colony', a formula first used by the British in their empire in the late eighteenth century, was established in the territory, including an Executive Council and a Legislative Council, in which the white population was given unofficial representation, initially in the shape of two nominated members, before the principle of election was accepted in the middle of the First World War, and implemented in 1919, giving Europeans eleven elected unofficial members.[50] In the German territory, a similar impulse led to the creation of a 'Governor's Council', an advisory rather than a legislative body, in 1904, where white unofficial opinion was heard.[51] Under British rule, Executive and Legislative Councils were created in

[47] Iliffe, *Modern History*, pp.126, 141-2. Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, pp.253-6.
[48] Iliffe, *Modern History*, p.262, p.303. Smith, 'The Europeans', p.445.
[49] Darwin, *Unfinished Empire*, pp.214-5.
[50] Sorrenson, *Origins*, Ch.15. Hailey, *Survey*, p.296.
[51] Iliffe, *Modern History*, pp.148-9.

Tanganyika in 1920 and 1926 respectively, and Europeans were granted unofficial seats in the latter.[52] The first elections, however, were not held until 1958.[53]

At this same early stage of European rule, Indian merchants, long established on the East African coast as the financiers of the pre-colonial caravan trade, followed the Europeans into the interior of both the German and British spheres, encouraged by officials keen to promote African production, a supplement to white economic initiatives. At European stations, these incomers established small shops, or *dukas* [sic], from where they exchanged a widening variety of imported goods for a range of local produce, including ivory, skins and hides, and foodstuffs. Their numbers in the region were swelled by two further waves of immigration from the Indian sub-continent, first as 'coolies', labourers contracted to build the Ugandan railway, some of whom chose to remain in the East African Protectorate, and more importantly, by a wave of free immigration from India (in the early years still carried across the Indian Ocean by dhow) stretching into the inter-war period, pulled by the magnetic prospect of profit.[54]

By 1912, there were 12,000 Asians in the East African Protectorate, a number which had risen to 23,000 by 1921 and 87,000 by 1948. In the same period, the Asian population in Tanganyika increased from 10,000 to 46,000, far outstripping the number of white settlers.[55] In Kenya, aided by the support of the government of India and India House in London, this population was granted two seats in the Legislative Council in 1920, after much political controversy, a number increased under pressure the following year to five, to be elected on a communal franchise (not the common roll Asian politicians had hoped for) keeping the political representation of Europeans and Asians

[52] Hailey, *Survey*, pp.302-3. Smith, 'The Europeans', p.447.
[53] Lonsdale, 'East Africa', p.541.
[54] R.G. Gregory, *South Asians in East Africa: An Economic and Social History, 1890-1980* (Oxford, 1993), Ch.1. Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, pp.150-3.
[55] J.S. Mangat, 'The Immigrant Communities: The Asians', in D.A. Low and A. Smith, (eds.), *History of East Africa* Vol.III (Oxford, 1976), pp.467-83. Sorrenson, *Origins*, p.24.

separate.[56] Under British rule, Asians in Tanganyika were granted two seats when the council was formed in 1926.[57] Africans, however, remained directly excluded from both.

The need to find a sustainable financial basis for their imperial adventures, then, led the British and German administrators who had arrived in East Africa in the 1890s to seek out both an effective basis for their administration and sources of economic development. The result was the entrenchment by the 1920s of an administrative system divided along lines of tribe and race. In the 1920s, Governor Cameron gave thought to the possibility of bringing 'native' and 'non-native' administrations together, linking the colonial periphery to the territorial centre by developing, first, two territorial level councils, one African the other non-African, and subsequently sending representatives from both to a single Legislative Council.[58] His plans, however, were soon forgotten, overtaken by an economic crisis that threatened the very existence of the colonial state. They were not seriously revived until after the Second World War, when the intensified 'development' demanded by the invigorated British led them to begin to rethink the basis of their collaborative bargains. That, however, is to anticipate. Having examined the attempted establishment of effective administrations in Kenya and Tanganyika, we must now turn our attention to the efforts made by the two administrations to develop the material basis on which those administrations might rest.

[56] Hailey, *Survey*, p.297. Clough, *Fighting Two Sides*, p.34. J. Lonsdale, 'The Depression and the Second World War in the Transformation of Kenya', in D. Killingray and R. Rathbone, (eds.), *Africa and the Second World War* (Basingstoke, 1986), p.101. R.M. Maxon, 'The Devonshire Declaration: The Myth of Missionary Intervention', *History in Africa*, Vol.18, (1991), p.261.
[57] Hailey, *Survey*, p.303.
[58] *Ibid*, p.472.

III

Scholars have sometimes been seduced by an image of Kenya as a 'settler' colony and of Tanganyika as a 'peasant' colony, the latter protected from the extremes of white exploitation by the paternalist provisions of the mandate, and each with a correspondingly distinct experience of colonial rule.[59] Such a division, however, is far too blunt to be of any real value in coming to terms with the impact of foreign rule. In the 1930s, to take one telling example, while the first steps were being taken to develop African coffee production in Kenya's south-western Gusii highlands, in Upare in north-east Tanganyika, administrators were uprooting African coffee in order to protect settler interests. If we are to come to terms with colonial rule and the way in which it was experienced, closer attention, then, must be paid to more localised experiences and their development over time. The following two sections sketch in the barest terms, the uneven impact of the social and economic forces associated with colonialism in this region, and their widening and deepening across space and time, before the final section of the chapter looks more closely at their impact upon the intimate relationships of class, gender and generation.

While the Ugandan railway was constructed to link the 'pearl' of Uganda with the Mombasa coast, and the centre of what became Kenya was in the earliest years of the British presence of little interest other than as a fuelling station for trade traffic (a 'space… to be traversed in order to reach the Victoria Nyanza but otherwise of no account', according to Eliot[60]), the decision to make white settlers the engine of economic development, 'the yeast leavening the inert dough of Africa's indigenous peoples', re-orientated the economic centre of gravity in the territory and made the highlands of the centre its commercial heart, a shift that was reflected in the transfer of the capital from Mombasa to the new town of Nairobi in 1907.[61] A few coastal sisal plantations aside, it was to Kenya's fertile western and central highlands and the Rift Valley, the 'irregular butterfly shape'

[59] E.g. A. Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy* (2nd Edition, Oxford, 2013), p.75.
[60] Mungeam, *Documents*, p.86.
[61] Smith, 'The Europeans', p.435. Sorrenson, *Origins*, p.63.

around Nairobi, that white settlers flocked, very largely with the intention of establishing owner-run mixed farms, combining crop production with animal husbandry, as well as establishing coffee farms around Kiambu, and creating what was by 1914 the geographically compact area, roughly 3.1 million hectares, of settlement that would come to form one unequal half of the heart of Kenya's colonial economy.[62]

The European commercial presence in Tanganyika, on the other hand, was far more dispersed.[63] The DOAG, shorn of its administrative responsibilities, began to establish manager-run plantations in the north-east of the territory, in Usambara and Bonde, in the 1890s, focussing initially on coffee, but quickly switching their attentions to fibrous sisal, and at the same time beginning the construction of a railway from Tanga to serve this area. West Usambara, Kilimanjaro and Meru also became, from the turn of the twentieth century, the destination for settlers intent on establishing mixed farms combined with small coffee plantations. The European presence was not, however, concentrated in this area, and sisal plantations spread down the coast, along the line of the central railway as it was constructed in the second half of the decade, as well as into the southern highlands. By the outbreak of World War One, around 320,000 hectares of land were under European control, half of which was in the north-east of the territory, and sisal production had grown from a mere 0.6 tonnes in 1898 to 20,835 tonnes in 1913, roughly a third of German East Africa's exports, a figure which reached 62,000 tons in 1929, buoyed by rising world prices.[64]

The most immediate need of white enterprise in both territories was a ready supply of labour, a need shared by the colonial state itself, as well as by the Indian merchants who dominated the trade of both territories. In both colonies, the state took steps to meet this need, as Governor Gotzen wrote: 'To support economic undertakings in the present state of undeveloped labour

[62] F. Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation Labour and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya* (London, 1980), p.248. Berman, *Control and Crisis*, p.219. Smith, 'The Europeans', p.434. Hailey, *Survey*, p.714. C. Hornsby, *Kenya: A History Since Independence* (London, 2013), p.26.
[63] Smith, 'The Europeans', pp.437-8. Hailey, *Survey*, p.302.
[64] Iliffe, *Modern History*, Ch.5. H. Sabea, 'Mastering the Landscape? Sisal Plantation, Land and Labour in Tanga Region, 1893-1980s', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol.41, No.3, (2008), pp.411-17. Coulson, *Tanzania*, pp.75-6. N. Westcott, 'The East African Sisal Industry, 1929-1949: The Marketing of a Colonial Commodity During Depression and War', *Journal of African History*, Vol.25, No.4, (1984), p.447.

relations is one of the main tasks of the administrative authorities'.[65] To this end, in the early years of colonial rule, both administrations used shifting combinations of coercion and taxation to bring out a labour supply. In the British territory, in the period up to 1908, administrators also directly recruited labour, before retreating, leaving the scene to professional recruiters, concerned not to be seen as partisans of private white interest, were controversially pushed back into the fray by Nairobi in the period immediately after the First World War in the face of an acute labour shortage, before retreating again in 1921, under the orders of the Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill, following irresistible pressure from local officials, missions and the House of Commons. To the same end, the British also sought to limit African land rights (while at the same time protecting them). And in both, regulations, most notably in the form of racialized Master and Servant laws, were enacted in an effort to discipline labour (and settler counter-action), efforts which in Kenya culminated in the introduction of pass laws, the notorious *kipande*, in 1915.[66]

Initially most labourers (which included women and children) on the plantations of Tanganyika came from the immediately surrounding area. Typically, they worked for no more than thirty days at a time, often returning to their homes in the evening to cultivate their own *shambas*. At this early stage, plantations also drew in migrant labour from those people, principally from the western plateaux, with a long history of working away from home as porters in the nineteenth century trade. From around the turn of the century, the need to meet German tax demands increased the labour supply further, and by the 1910s around 172,000 people were in employment of all types, private and public, across Tanganyika, in growing towns as well as on plantations, drawn increasingly from distant, less agriculturally favoured areas, such as Njombe, which unlike the areas

[65] Cited in Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, p.342.
[66] Clayton and Savage, *Government and Labour*, pp.21-2, p.28. Berman and Lonsdale, 'Coping with Contradictions', pp.84-94. B. Berman and J. Lonsdale, 'Crises of Accumulation, Coercion and the Colonial State: The Development of the Labour Control System, 1919-29', in B. Berman and J. Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa* (London, 1992), pp.110-12. S. Stichter, *Migrant Labour in Kenya: Capitalism and African Response, 1895-1975* (Harlow, 1982). Iliffe, *Modern History*, p.151, pp.160-2. T. Sunseri, 'Labour Migration in Colonial Tanzania and the Hegemony of South African Historiography', *African Affairs*, Vol.95, No.381, (1996), pp.581-98. Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, pp.215-6, pp.339-413. D.M. Anderson, 'Master and Servant in Colonial Kenya, 1895-1939, *Journal of African History*, Vol.31, No.3, (2000), pp.459-85.

surrounding European agriculture, had little alternative but to sell their labour to meet these demands.[67] By 1926, 20% of Njombe's men were working outside the district, a level maintained across the interwar period.[68] In Kenya, likewise, by 1914, state pressures, buttressed by home pressures on young males to contribute to household accumulation in an age when raiding and herding, the domain of the young, had been respectively curtailed and reduced by British fiat and the disasters of the 1890s, had brought out an average of 24% of adult men in Kenya into waged work, again in burgeoning towns (with their definite, if imperfect, patterns of racial segregation) as well as on estates, a figure which masked, again, significant regional differences in the extent of the labour supply, which in central Kavirondo and the districts surrounding Nairobi, reached as high as 32%.[69]

The needs of the Kenya's settlers were, however, particularly desperate. Typically, these farmers were significantly undercapitalised. They borrowed money against the value of the land they bought, a value driven up by speculation, rather than its productive potential, and characteristically used all they borrowed in the purchase of the land itself. In turn, they came to rely on high interest loans to fund their day-to-day costs. As a consequence, they were unable to bring the vast majority of their land under production, a failure exacerbated by their astonishing lack of farming skill. It followed, that in the two decades after 1919 they managed to use, on average, a paltry 10% of their land for the purpose of arable farming.[70]

To meet this need, and mirroring their own entry into Kenya, in the 1910s settler farmers, invited African 'squatters' to use part of their recently acquired land for grazing and cultivation, in exchange for their performing some labour. In the north-western area of the settled lands, squatters were drawn from among the Nandi. Further south and east, on the farms of the Rift Valley, the

[67] Iliffe, *Modern History*, p.151, p.157, pp.160-2. Sunseri, 'Labour Migration' pp.588-90.
[68] J.L. Giblin, *History of the Excluded: Making Family a Refuge from the State in Twentieth Century Tanzania* (Oxford, 2005), pp.107-9.
[69]Clayton and Savage, *Government and Labour*, pp.64-5. G. Kershaw, *Mau Mau from Below* (Oxford, 1997), pp.119-21, p.128. L. White, *The Comforts of Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi* (Chicago, 1990), pp.46-7. D. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire* (London, 2005), p.182.
[70] R.M.A. Van Zwanenberg, *Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya, 1919-39* (Nairobi, 1975), pp.1-12.

majority came from central Kenya, in particular from among the Kikuyu, and very largely from Kiambu district, enticed not so much by the alienation of 6% of their own land, as by the ambitions of families seeking access to larger and more fertile grounds.[71]

Before the end of the First World War, the grazing of squatter stock, possession of which was widely held to be a marker of social status, was unregulated, and the labour demanded of squatters, mostly consisting of the herding of settler stock, relatively undemanding, amounting to perhaps five months per year, divided between husbands and wives. In 1918, under settler pressure, the colonial government took steps to regularise these relationships and ensure the labour supply, introducing the first Resident Native Labour Ordinance, which included, as a fundamental provision, the obligation of squatters to provide a minimum of 180 days of labour per year on the white farm. The opportunities of the west, however, remained attractive enough to draw people in well into the 1920s, and between that decade and the late 1940s, the number of squatters increased from *c*.100,000 to *c*.150,000.[72] The rest of their work time was spent cultivating maize on their own *shambas* which they sold in markets created by the British presence - either to the European farmers, who used it to feed their contract labourers, or to local traders.[73] As one ex-squatter's wife put it many years later: 'Wealth did not come from salaries, no, it came from *shamba* produce and exchange'.[74]

The need of white estates and growing towns for food, along with the state's need for both a sustainable tax base, and a material basis to underpin their collaborative bargains, caused African commodity production to take off more generally in certain favoured areas, and above all in the fertile lands of central Kenya, the homeland of the Rift Valley squatters, and key provider of migrant

[71] C.P. Youe, 'Settler Capital and the Assault on the Squatter Peasantry in Kenya's Uasin Gishu District, 1942-63', *African Affairs*, Vol.87, No.348, (1988), p.394 & p.399. T. Kanogo, *Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau* (London, 1987), pp.19-35. Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', pp.383-4. Lonsdale, 'Authority, Gender and Violence', p.56.
[72] Anderson, 'Master and Servant', p.465. Hailey, *Survey*, p.721.
[73] Kanogo, *Squatters*, pp.19-20.
[74] Cited in Kanogo, *Squatters*, p.23.

labour.[75] In the nineteenth century, households in this area had increased production to meet the needs of passing caravans, a process which intensified as traffic grew with the European presence in the last decade of the century, and then further under formal colonial rule.[76] While settler fears of direct competition ruled out African production of valuable export crops (most notably coffee), ringed by settler farms, and with the ever growing Nairobi to the south, production of food crops for the internal market grew, first in Kiambu district, the tail of which tickled the capital, and after the extension of the railway (undertaken to serve settler interests) from Nairobi to Thika (completed in 1913), and then to Fort Hall and Nyeri (completed by 1930), in the two northern districts, facilitated in part by the colonial provision of new seed varieties.[77]

As commodity prices climbed in the 1920s, commercial production here flourished.[78] A district officer estimated that in 1931 the Kiambu Native Reserve consumed only 46% of what it grew, selling 41% to Nairobi and the White Highlands, 9% abroad, and 4% to other African areas in the colony, and all this despite the damage caused to the crop that year by a plague of locusts.[79] In the same period, wattle, a multi-purpose export crop of little interest to the settlers, was taken up. Between 1925 and 1932 the acreage under the crop (largely on the farms of chiefs and headmen) increased from 6,000 to 30,000 acres, while between 1925 and 1930 its export value doubled from £28,992 to £64,527.[80] The wealthy, in turn, invested their agricultural profits in trading ventures. By 1928, there were 208 African-owned shops in Fort Hall alone.[81] Cash-crop production by squatters in

[75] Berman, 'Structure and Process', p.155.
[76] Ambler, *Kenyan Communities*, p.102.
[77] A. Haugerud, *The Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya* (Cambridge, 1993), p.130. A.F.D. Mackenzie, *Land, Ecology and Resistance in Kenya, 1880-1952* (Edinburgh, 1998), p.28. Kershaw, *Mau Mau*, p.148. Berman and Lonsdale, 'Crises', p.118. C.C. Robertson, *Trouble Showed the Way: Women, Men and Trade in the Nairobi Area, 1890-1990* (Bloomington, 1997), Ch.2. R.T. Ogonda, 'Transport and Communications in the Colonial Economy', in W.R. Ochieng' and R.M. Maxon, (eds.), *An Economic History of Kenya* (Nairobi, 1992), p.131. G. Kitching, *Class and Economic Change in Kenya: The Making of an African Petit-Bourgeoisie* (London, 1980), pp.34-5.
[78] Kitching, *Class and Economic Change*, p.35. While statistical evidence is often incomplete, anecdotal evidence certainly points in this direction.
[79] Robertson, *Trouble Showed the Way*, p.78.
[80] R.M. Maxon, 'Where Did the Trees Go? The Wattle Bark Industry in Western Kenya, 1932-50', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol.34, No.3, (2001), pp.565-6. Kitching, *Class and Economic Change*, pp.64-5.
[81] Robertson, *Trouble Showed the Way*, pp.80-1.

the Rift Valley and in the reserves of Central Province formed the second unequal half of the heart of Kenya's colonial economy.

Away from this area, commercial production was less dramatic, but it nonetheless began to take off in certain places. The settler farms of Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu in the Western Highlands, for example, created a *posho* market for the maize of the southern areas of North Kavirondo. Likewise, the establishment of tea estates in Kericho on the western edge of the Rift Valley in the 1920s, opened a market for local African cultivators, an opportunity remarked upon in the 1925 District Report, which noted that 'the area under maize had increased enormously' that year, an observation reiterated two years later.[82]

In German East Africa, African production similarly had an important role to play in providing both the legitimacy of the German enterprise, and the basis of a sustainable administration, especially as the slowly developing sisal crops did not produce their first significant returns before 1904.[83] As people on Kilimanjaro sung of their local district officer: 'He has ordered all the people to plant wimbi, beans, all possible crops, to enable them to pay their tax'.[84]

As in Kenya, white agriculture created an expanding internal market in foodstuffs in the surrounding area. By the outbreak of the First World War, cultivators in Usambara, close to the sisal estates of Tanga, were selling their surplus produce to the plantations. In the decade after its conclusion, these efforts expanded markedly, and by 1927 African cultivators in Lushoto and Tanga districts produced a surplus big enough to feed 50,000 workers and export an additional 758 tons.[85]

In the earliest years of the German presence, however, the most significant African economic activity in the territory, and source of German revenue, was the wild rubber boom in the south which began in the late 1890s, driven by the demands of the nascent European and American motor industry. The boom was reflected in the almost doubling of the number of caravans passing

[82] Kitching, *Class and Economic Change*, pp.45-55.
[83] Iliffe, *Modern History*, p.126. Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, Chs.4&5.
[84] Cited in Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, p.176.
[85] Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, p.133, p.160. Hunter, 'Languages of Politics', p.28. Iliffe, *Modern History*, p.152.

through Kilwa, the coastal port on a highly active nineteenth century trade route, from 6,615 loads in 1899 to 11,334 in 1903, and in the tax take from the southern district, consisting of Kilwa, Mikindani and Lindi, which accounted for an astonishing 60% of the territory's tax revenue in 1898/9.[86]

German concerns about the sustainability of this trade were reflected in their efforts, after the turn of the century, to promote export agriculture based upon vegetable crops around Lindi, and around Kilwa on cultivated (rather than wild) rubber, as well as the notorious cotton plantations which played an important role in the *Maji Maji* rebellion.[87] The rebellion itself further encouraged moves towards official support for African agricultural production, completing the decline of Tanganyika's wild rubber trade, and therefore the loss of tax revenue, and persuading the administration of the need to avoid undermining the legitimacy of their enterprise by a heavy reliance on force. Prosperity, they hoped, would stave off insurrection. The government, therefore, placed an increasing emphasis upon promoting African export agriculture alongside European plantations, efforts intensified by the British after their assumption of control.[88]

In the aftermath of the rebellion, administrators placed railways (long discussed, but little developed) at the heart of both their military strategy and their thinking about economic development. The Uganda railway had stimulated African production in the British sphere, it was argued, and a similar undertaking would provide a similar impetus in German East Africa. In the eight years before the First World War, therefore, 1,500km of new track was laid, most of it part of the new central line, built along an old nineteenth century trading route, which was begun from Dar es Salaam in 1905, and which finally reached Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika in 1914.[89] African commercial production of groundnuts, rice and, especially, cotton, developed along its route, alongside European plantation agriculture. In the 1920s, the British sought to push these developments, in

[86] Becker, 'Traders', p.10. Larson, 'The Ngindo', pp.75, 95-6.
[87] Larson, 'The Ngindo', pp.98-9.
[88] Becker, 'Sudden Disaster', p.304. Sunseri, 'Labour Migration', pp.586-7. Coulson, *Tanzania*, p.68. Iliffe, *Modern History*, p.136.
[89] Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, pp.297-309. Iliffe, *Modern History*, p.136.

part by extending the central railway line to Mwanza in 1928 to carry the cotton crop from the central area of its production to the coast. African cultivation of cotton for export, in turn, slowly expanded.[90]

The most significant developments in Tanganyika, however, occurred on either side of Lake Victoria. In the north-east, the extension of the northern railway line to Moshi, which it reached in 1912, and Arusha, where the railway (delayed by war) arrived in 1930, while designed primarily to serve European settlers, gave access to markets and stimulated the production of arabica coffee by Africans on Kilimanjaro (a crop introduced by missionaries in the 1890s) after 1907, a move the German administration did little to stop, despite settler criticism.[91] When the British arrived on the mountain in 1916, around one thousand Chagga were engaged in coffee cultivation.[92] By 1924, buoyed by rising prices, and aided by the weakness of the area's much reduced settler population, their number had increased to 6,716, possessing between them 987,175 trees. By 1929, the latter figure was six million.[93]

On the north-western side of Lake Victoria, in Bukoba district, it was the construction of the Uganda railway in the British sphere which created a market for local produce, which could be carried across the lake on one of the five steamers which by 1911 were 'plying to Uganda ports and the German ports of Bukoba and Mwanza', to then be carried by rail to Mombasa.[94] The German administration, in turn, began to encourage the production of robusta coffee, a crop which had been grown under a royal monopoly in the pre-colonial period (for the purpose of chewing rather than drinking). Cultivation grew slowly in the first two decades of the century, before gathering pace under British rule, pushed initially by the demand of the local administration that farmers plant one hundred coffee trees each. It was estimated on the back of this demand that in the five years after 1919, ten million coffee seedlings were planted in the area. In turn, high prices in the 1920s

[90] R. Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development Policy After the Second World War: The Case of Sukumaland Tanganyika* (Berlin, 2008), pp.51-5.
[91] Sunseri, 'Labour Migration', p. 587. Iliffe, *Modern History*, p.136. p.154.
[92] Hunter, 'Languages of Politics', p.28.
[93] Iliffe, *Modern History*, p.274.
[94] Fazan, *Colonial Kenya*, p.30.

generated a great local enthusiasm for the crop, and production continued to grow across the decade, becoming the territory's most valuable African export.[95]

By the end of the 1920s, then, white and black farmers in certain favoured areas had achieved a relative prosperity in a time of buoyant world markets. In turn, driven by settler needs and black competition, the wages of African labourers increased across the decade.[96] Relative prosperity, however, brought tensions between expanding white and black agriculture increasingly into focus where the two touched. In turn, the efforts of the colonial state to manage racial contradictions came to shape the economic impact of colonialism in certain areas. In north-east Tanganyika, the growing number of white coffee farmers, armed with their own lobbying organisation after 1928, invested significant energies in attempting to persuade the colonial administration to curb nearby African production of the crop, claiming that African coffee would spread disease, reduce the value of their product, encourage the theft of seedlings from European farms, and deprive them of essential labour, destroying white farming.[97] On Kilimanjaro, where African arabica coffee farming was well-established, the administration understood their legitimacy, and local order, to hinge on their willingness to defend African production, settler demands were rebuffed. In other parts of the north-east, however, where there was the potential for coffee to grow, but where it had not yet been as fully established, agreements were made that the state, concerned about the political trouble settlers could cause, and convinced of their ultimate economic worth, would encourage only lower value robusta coffee. Honouring their agreement, administrators actively uprooted African coffee plants in Upare in the mid-1930s, despite the demands of the Depression.[98] Like the labour market, colonial produce markets were far from free.

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[95] B. Weiss, *Sacred Trees, Bitter Harvests: Globalising Coffee in Northwest Tanzania* (Portsmouth, 2003), pp.143-7, p.151.K.R. Curtis, 'Smaller is Better: A Consensus of Peasants and Bureaucrats in Colonial Tanganyika', in W.G. Clarence-Smith and S. Topik, (eds.), *The Global Coffee Economy in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 1500-1989* (Cambridge, 2003), pp.318-21. Iliffe, *Modern History*, p.156.

[96] Berman and Lonsdale, 'Crises', p.108. Lonsdale, 'Depression', pp.103-4.

[97] Iliffe, *Modern History*, pp.274-6.

[98] Iliffe, *Modern History*, pp.289-90. I.N. Kimambo, *Penetration and Protest in Tanzania: The Impact of the World Economy on Pare, 1860-1960* (London, 1991), p.80.

The most serious contradiction occurred in Kenya's settled area and Central Province. As African production increased in the Kikuyu reserves in the 1920s, at the same time as the population began to increase, claims about lands 'stolen' by Europeans became increasingly loud, and formed the background against which the Kenya Land Commission was established in 1933.[99] At the same time, as commodity prices rose, white settlers made a concerted (but far from successful) effort to move from the monocropping of maize into the stock and dairy industries. As they did so, they made increasing noises about the dangers posed to their herds and lands by squatter stock, and put pressure on the colonial administration to take steps to regulate and reduce squatter holdings. The subsequent efforts of the state in this direction, culminating in 1929, and referred to by the squatters as '*kifagio*', or 'the broom', significantly reduced squatter wealth, sweeping it away. By the 1930s, the opportunities offered to squatters in the Rift Valley in the 1910s were beginning to be whittled down.[100]

At the end of the 1920s, then, the development of African cash-crops continued to be extremely uneven, shaped by environmental conditions, racial politics and, above all, access to markets. Away from the main transport lines, production was slow. In the Gusii highlands, in the south-west of Kenya, for example, the colonial government, concerned that the local inhabitants should be able to pay tax, distributed seeds and took some steps to facilitate the development of cash-crop production. Maize, sim sim, wheat and groundnuts all began to be cultivated for sale. But, far from accessible markets, commercial production was engaged only on a small scale, allowing tax demands to be met but little more.[101] In Embu and Meru, north-east of the three Kikuyu districts, likewise, distance from the market, and the high cost that was, therefore, involved in transporting the bulky maize crop, acted as a brake on cash-crop development.[102] And, similarly, in Tanganyika, while cash-crop cultivation began to a limited extent amongst, for example, the Ngoni, where

[99] Anderson, *Histories*, p.10.
[100] Kanogo, *Squatters*, pp.41-6.
[101] Maxon, *Conflict and Accommodation*, pp.55-7. R.M.A Van Zwanenberg, 'The Development of Peasant Commodity Production in Kenya, 1920-1940', *The Economic History Review*, Vol.27, No.3, (1974), p.453.
[102] Van Zwanenberg, 'The Development of Peasant Commodity Production', p.452.

tobacco was grown, and in Mbinga, where coffee was planted, the lack of even rudimentary transport infrastructure inhibited production. Away from the three main cultivation zones along Lake Victoria's lazy smile, therefore, production remained sluggish.[103] Meanwhile, the former boom area of the territory, the south-east, with its sandy soils and unpredictable rains, unsuitable grounds for agricultural production, declined to a backwater, engaged in the colonial economy only as a supplier of labour, plans for the construction of better transport infrastructure in the region mooted by German officials in the boom years of the late nineteenth century, now long forgotten.[104]

Social change in the colonial conjuncture was at least as profound, and uneven, as economic change. At its heart, was the spread of Christianity. Developing colonial rule offered missionaries of various societies, nationalities, and denominations, long established on the East African coast, the opportunity to move inland.[105] While, therefore, in 1900 (before the arrival of the railway) there was not a single mission in Kavirondo province, on the east of Lake Victoria, by 1908, six different missionary societies were in operation (and competition).[106] At the end of the first decade of the century, Kenya had in total eighteen societies with seventy mission stations between them.[107] It is difficult to generalise about their distribution. Perhaps the most that can be said, is that everywhere was touched, but some areas earlier and more firmly than others. While, therefore, competition between missionary societies was evident in the first decade of the new century in the Kenya's densely populated, and accessible, central highlands, in the Gusii highlands to the south-west, a late area of conquest and remote from the railway, missionaries did not establish a local base until 1911.[108]

Most Africans never came into direct contact with missionaries, however. The Word, rather, was carried by an army of African catechists, a sub-imperial mirror of indirect rule.[109] The same was

[103] Iliffe, *Modern History*, pp.287-8, pp.292-3.
[104] Becker, 'Sudden Disaster', pp.298-9, 302-5.
[105] Sorrenson, *Origins*, p.256. Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, p.577.
[106] A. Hastings, *The Church in Africa, 1450-1950* (Oxford, 1994), p.415.
[107] Sorrenson, *Origins*, p.259.
[108] Sorrenson, *Origins*, pp.257-8. Maxon, *Conflict and Accommodation*, pp.58-9.
[109] Hastings, *Church*, p.438.

true of what was intrinsically linked to the spread of Christianity in this era: western education, and especially literacy. African schools (kept separate from Asian and European schools across this period) came broadly in two forms: those in mission stations, and, the far more numerous, village 'out-schools', of which there were some 250 in western Kenya in 1915, run by those same catechists, and catering not only for children, but often adults, too, offering a few hours instruction per day, very often in newly standardised vernaculars.[110] Firm in their belief that Christian men required Christian wives, various missions also encouraged the education of women.[111] As a tiny adjunct to the mission effort, in the German territory, the state, desperate for local administrators, sponsored schools at, first, Tanga and, subsequently, Bayamoyo and Dar es Salaam, also offering, on certain conditions, financial aid to mission schools, although very few ever qualified.[112] In British East Africa, however, it was not until the 1920s (the same decade that the first African secondary school appeared) that government became involved in providing financial help to mission schools (at the cost of greater supervision).[113] As world markets turned, however, these grants-in-aid became the subject of swingeing cuts.[114]

Under the impact of the Depression, the export earnings of Britain's three East African territories, Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, fell from £14.5 million in 1929 to £8.3 million in 1931.[115] In turn, the shoestring revenues of the state fell dramatically, in Tanganyika by 25%, from £1,972,858 in 1928/9 to £1,522,368 in 1931/2, as commodity prices, white and African, plummeted, and opportunities for waged-work declined, a significant withdrawal in districts such as Nyeri, where by the early 1930s around 13,000 people were absent at any one time working in Nairobi and the

[110] J. Anderson, *The Struggle for the School: The Interaction of Missionary, Colonial Government and Nationalist Enterprise in the Development of Formal Education in Kenya* (London, 1970), p.113. B.A. Ogot, *My Footprints on the Sands of Time* (Kisumu, 2011), pp.21-2.
[111] L. Buchert, *Education in the Development of Tanzania, 1919-90* (London, 1994), pp.17-18. Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, pp.524-5. Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, p.219.
[112] Koponen, *Development for Exploitation*, pp.505-6, p.521.
[113] Anderson, *Struggle*, p.20.
[114] Iliffe, *Modern History*, pp.354-5.
[115] Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development Policy*, pp.55-6.

settled areas.[116] The consequences were profound.[117] As work opportunities shrivelled, the African population of Dar es Salaam and Nairobi declined, the latter by 28% between 1929 and 1933.[118] Tax collection in south-east Tanganyika, a labour supplying region, all but collapsed in the four years after 1930.[119] In Kenya, the cost of the railway debt (Eliot's 'fundamental and recurring problem of East African finance') became crippling.[120] And in Tanganyika, the golden rule of territorial self-sufficiency was broken and the administration forced to call on Treasury loans.[121]

In these circumstances, the need to rebuild the fiscal base of the state was acute. Low commodity prices, however, made the possibility of building the recovery on white backs all but impossible, as the export price of maize remained well below the cost of white production into the late 1930s.[122] The decision was taken in both, therefore, to make the African producer the saviour of the colonial state.[123] Desperation was the mother of invention.

Steps were taken in both territories, therefore, to foster African cash-crop production. To this end, Kenya's Agriculture Department divided the territory into five climatic and ecological zones, drawing up plans for each.[124] Previously marginal areas, such as the Taita Hills near the Tanganyika border and the Gusii highlands in the west of the colony, were identified as having untapped economic potential. In the straightest of straightened times, the key emphasis in the campaign to unlock it was placed on education, supplemented by an unhealthy dollop of coercion. Agricultural

[116] D. Anderson and D. Throup, 'Africans and Agricultural Production in Colonial Kenya: The Myth of the War as a Watershed', *Journal of African History*, Vol.26, No.4, (1985), pp.328-9. Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development Policy*, p.56. Maxon, *Conflict and Accommodation*, pp.93-4. Van Zwanenberg, 'The Development of Peasant Commodity Production', pp.449-50. Iliffe, *Modern History*, p.344.
[117] Lonsdale, 'East Africa', p.537.
[118] J.R. Brennan and A. Burton, 'The Emerging History of Dar es Salaam, *c*.1862-2000', in J.R. Brennan, A. Burton and Y. Lawi, (eds.), *Dar es Salaam: Histories from an Emerging African Metropolis* (Dar es Salaam, 2007), p.37. J. Iliffe, *Africans: The History of a Continent* (Cambridge, 1995), p.221.
[119] Becker, 'Sudden Disaster', p.307. D.M.P. McCarthy, 'Organising Underdevelopment from the Inside: The Bureaucratic Economy in Tanganyika, 1919-1940', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol.10, No.4, (1977), p.585.
[120] Eliot, *Protectorate*, p.188. Lonsdale, 'Depression', pp.104-5.
[121] Iliffe, *Modern History*, p.344.
[122] I. Spencer, 'Settler Dominance, Agricultural Production and the Second World War in Kenya', *Journal of African History*, Vo.21, No.4, (1980), p.497.
[123] Anderson and Throup, 'Africans and Agricultural Production', p.329. McCarthy, 'Organising Underdevelopment', pp.591-2. Berman, *Control and Crisis*, p.235.
[124] Kitching, *Class and Economic Change*, p.62, pp.102-3. Berman, *Control and Crisis*, p.235.

officers were posted to these districts, efforts were put into educational propaganda and instruction, seed farms funded by Local Native Councils were set up, and steps were taken to improve the local marketing infrastructure. In both areas, a rapid expansion of production (though difficult to quantify with any precision) of vegetable crops in Taita, and of maize, wimbi and beans in the west resulted. In the Gusii highlands, moreover, distant from Kenya's sensitive white heart, the first steps were taken to encourage African-grown coffee on the farms of chiefs. The area's previous (relative) isolation began, suddenly, to look like an advantage.[125]

The expansion of production in this decade was, nonetheless, greatest in areas where cash-crop cultivation was well established, and in particular, in Kenya's Central Province. There, wattle production increased by 600% across the 1930s, and food crops, increasingly carried to Nairobi's markets on the heads of women, boomed too, in part a product of the expanded use of manure in this decade, leading the local Assistant Agricultural Officer to describe Kiambu in the mid-1930s as 'the market garden of Kenya' from where 'vegetables are sent to all parts, as far as Uganda and Tanganyika'.[126]

In Tanganyika, the administration, likewise, sought to boost African production through a 'Plant-More-Crops' campaign.[127] Controversial at the time, both the campaign and the decade more generally have been underexplored by scholars.[128] The available evidence, however, points towards a story similar to that seen in Kenya. While there is little by way of sources on the steps taken to boost production, or its precise place in the 'Plant-More-Crops' campaign, the output of rice in Rungwe district, on the edge of Lake Nyasa, for instance, increased from around 500 tons in 1932 to 1,200 tons in 1939, despite yearly fluctuations in output, presumably caused by weather

[125] B. Bravman, *Making Ethnic Ways: Communities and their Transformations in Taita, Kenya, 1800-1950* (Oxford, 1998), pp.213-5. Maxon, *Conflict and Accommodation*, pp.99-102.
[126] Berman, *Control and Crisis*, p.234. Kitching, *Class and Economic Change*, pp.63-5. Kershaw, *Mau Mau*, p.157. Robertson, *Trouble Showed the Way*, p.46, pp.83-4.
[127] Iliffe, *Modern History*, pp.348-9.
[128] For a sense of the controversy see A.J. Wakefield, 'Tanganyika Territory and Native Uplift', *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol.39, No.156, (1940), p.234.

conditions.[129] In the Kilombero Valley, efforts were made to promote the growth of cotton, a crop which had been first tried, unsuccessfully, in the area in the 1920s. In the 1930s, these efforts produced mixed results. Households with access to good land and plentiful labour appear to have taken up the crop; those less favoured, showed far less enthusiasm.[130] It was in Lake Province, however, that the impact of the campaign was most forcefully felt and the results most dramatic. Mirroring efforts made in Kenya, 160 additional agricultural extension officers were employed to promote the production of cotton, and output, in turn, increased by a factor of six, from three million pounds in 1929 to eighteen million in 1936.[131]

Expanding production in the 1930s was shadowed by growing environmental concerns. In Bukoba district, a boom area in the 1920s, these were bound up with economic worries. Preoccupied by low world prices, the Agricultural Department began to take an interest in the environment in which coffee was grown, seeking to improve the quality of the crop, and give it a competitive advantage in a difficult world market. To this end, they introduced new 'Coffee Rules' in 1937, which regulated, amongst other things, the crops that could be grown on household farms, the spacing between coffee seedlings, and, indeed, the right of local farmers to plant, demands which were to be enforced by fines or imprisonment in the event of non-compliance. The rules were widely resented and were met with a defiant '*Twaiyanga!*' or 'We refuse to allow you on our farms!', before, eventually, efforts to enforce them were quietly dropped.[132]

Elsewhere, economics and ecology came into conflict. Expanded African production raised fears in parts of the administration about its impact upon the health of the land, a concern voiced by the chief engineer of the Tanganyika railway, C. Gillman, who in May 1935 referred ironically in his

[129] P.H. Gulliver, *Land Tenure and Social Change Among the Nyakyusa: An Essay in Applied Anthropology in South-West Tanganyika* (Kampala, 1956), p.13.
[130] J. Monson, 'Rice and Cotton, Ritual and Resistance: Cash-Cropping in Colonial Tanganyika, 1920-40', in A. Isaacman and R. Roberts, (eds.), *Cotton, Colonialism and Social History in Sub-Saharan Africa* (London, 1995), pp.268-84.
[131] Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development Policy*, pp.57-9.
[132] Weiss, *Sacred Trees*, pp.152-4. Curtis, 'Smaller is Better', pp.322-5.

diary to the government's 'Plant more crops and destroy your Land Policy'.[133] At this point, existential fears kept positive action at bay. These complaints, however, were to take on a new significance in the second half of the 1940s.

[133]Cited in McCarthy, 'Organising Underdevelopment', p.596. Iliffe, *Modern History*, pp.348-9. D. Anderson, 'Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography and Drought: The Colonial State and Soil Conservation in East Africa During the 1930s', *African Affairs*, Vol.83, No.332, (1984), pp.321-43. Anderson and Throup, 'Africans and Agricultural Production', pp.330-3.

IV

In the first half of the 1940s, though, such concerns remained on the back burner, as the danger of the Depression was succeeded by the graver threat posed to the imperial centre by the Second World War. To meet this threat, the long-standing emphasis on territorial self-sufficiency, aimed at insulating British taxpayers against the costs of empire, was replaced by a new emphasis on the role of the empire in, first, an integrated imperial war effort and, subsequently, metropolitan recovery, efforts accompanied by increasingly shrill worries about the state of the land. The impact of these concerns was both profound and, as ever, uneven. As the 1940s rolled into the 1950s, however, the economic and social forces associated with colonialism continued to both widen and intensify.

In the early years of the war, East Africa's colonial administrations stressed food production as the basic aim of government policy, initially to ensure that dollar imports were restricted, but increasingly as a more proactive part of the war effort.[134] Those African areas, notably Lake Province, which produced non-food cash-crops, therefore, saw a significant change in the emphasis of the administration's policy.[135] After 1942, Britain's nadir and the pivot of East Africa's war following the loss of the Far East and the entry of the USA into the conflict, demand for East African wheat, maize and vegetable crops shot up to feed Allied troops in the Middle East, from where Britain sought to defend both halves of her embattled 'world system'. Areas where food crops were grown for sale were, therefore, lashed to the imperial war effort and guaranteed prices were offered to both Africans and Europeans, albeit at a significantly higher rate for whites (ostensibly on the basis that

[134] N. Westcott, 'The Impact of the Second World War on Tanganyika, 1939-49', in D. Killingray and R. Rathbone, (eds.), *Africa and the Second World War* (Basingstoke, 1986), p.147. Maxon, 'Where Did the Trees Go?', p.577.
[135] Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development Policy*, p.86.

European producers paid for the transport of their crops and Africans did not) to secure their produce.[136]

In a number of previously marginal areas, these guarantees overcame, for the first time, the economic disincentives to cash-crop production created by distance from markets, by offering a uniform price to growers wherever they were. In other areas, they merely added to existing incentives.[137] In these circumstances, the output of rice from Rungwe district reached a wartime peak of 2,900 tons in 1944, more than doubling its 1939 level.[138] Vegetable production in the Taita Hills continued to expand, as it did in the Usambara mountains, and in Kiambu, where the value of vegetable exports increased from £35,000 in 1941 to £120,000 in 1942.[139] And wartime demand proved to be the decisive turning point in the economic history of the Gusii highlands, where the pulse which had begun to quicken in the previous decade started to race. Here, the new price incentives, along with improvements made to transport infrastructure, led to the doubling of maize exports between 1941 and 1942, and then again by 1946.[140]

In addition to official sales, a black market, by its very nature difficult to quantify, flourished in the shade of marketing controls.[141] Much of Tanganyika's rice crop seems to have been distributed this way.[142] Similarly, the district commissioner of Machakos suggested that producers from Kenya's Central Province were demanding up to 60/- per bag of maize, ten times the government's price, in his district as famine struck in the period 1942-44.[143] The greatest advantage accrued to those areas with the best access to markets, especially around Nairobi, where free

[136] Westcott, 'Impact of the Second World War', pp.146-7. Anderson and Throup, 'Africans and Agricultural Production', p.335. Lonsdale, 'Depression', pp.119-121. Darwin, *Empire Project*, pp.523-6.
[137] Kitching, *Class and Economic Change*, p.109.
[138] Gulliver, *Land Tenure and Social Change*, p.13.
[139] Bravman, *Making Ethnic Ways*, p.215. Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, p.161. Anderson and Throup, 'Africans and Agricultural Production', p.339.
[140] Maxon, *Conflict and Accommodation*, p.115.
[141] Westcott, 'Impact of the Second World War', p.149. Anderson and Throup, 'Africans and Agricultural Production', pp.337-9.
[142] Westcott, 'Impact of the Second World War', p. 147.
[143] Anderson and Throup, 'Africans and Agricultural Production', p.340. Kitching, *Class and Economic Change*, pp.109-10.

market prices were significantly higher than the controlled price.[144] There, producers from Kiambu, as well as squatters in the Rift Valley, increased the number of acres they cultivated as they sold their maize and potato crops, transported by female traders, hawking their produce from door to door at night in order to evade controls, to feed a population which increased from 41,000 in 1939 to 66,500 in 1941.[145] War could be profitable, dangerously so.

It was, above all, European farmers who gained. If the African producer had been designated the saviour of the colonial state in the early years of the Depression, then the war proved to be the saviour of shrinking white agriculture.[146] The guaranteed price of European maize quickly reached 13/- a bag, a significant increase on the 5/- typical in the previous decade, in addition to which grants were offered for breaking new land and planting.[147] In response, white production rapidly increased. In Kenya, white land under maize increased from 80,000 acres in 1941 to 131,563 acres at the end of the war, and land under wheat from 103,000 to 184,500 acres in the same period.[148] Wartime opportunity allowed Kenya's indebted settlers to repay their debts to commercial banks, and to diversify production from the monocropping of maize, which had typified the interwar period, into mixed farming, making white agriculture a viable economic concern for the first time, and leading some officials to accuse them of profiteering.[149] As we shall see, their prosperity was to have a profound impact on Kenya's post-war history.

Kenya and Tanganyika's sisal growers, especially the smaller ones, had similarly struggled in the 1930s as prices fell. Facing economic oblivion, they resorted to self-exploitation (and political lobbying), increasing production in a desperate bid to make ends meet. The loss of the competitor hard fibres produced by Java and the Philippines to Japan at the end of 1941 and the entry of the USA into the war, however, quickly reversed their fortunes, reinvigorating their estates. While

[144] Kitching, *Class and Economic Change*, pp.109-10.
[145] Anderson and Throup, 'Africans and Agricultural Production', p.342. White, *Comforts*, pp.147-8. Robertson, *Trouble Showed the Way*, pp.105-6.
[146] Spencer, 'Settler Dominance', pp.497-514.
[147] *Ibid*, pp.502-3.
[148] Anderson and Throup, 'Africans and Agricultural Production', pp.335-6.
[149] Spencer, 'Settler Dominance', p.507.

wartime marketing controls gave them a price well below that obtainable on the free market, growers were, nonetheless, able to achieve a prosperity unthinkable in the previous decade.[150]

Expanded white production had a knock-on effect for Africans in both territories, as white growers, hungry for labour, once again demanded Leviathan's help. To satiate their appetites, the colonial government controversially introduced labour conscription in Kenya in 1942, and employment outside the reserves touched new heights, reaching 55% of adult males engaged in free and conscripted labour in North Kavirondo by 1943. In Tanganyika, 84,501 Africans were conscripted to labour on white estates during the war, while a further 97,000 Kenyan Africans and 86,740 Tanganyikan Africans served in the army, a forcing house for adult male literacy.[151] In labour producing districts like Njombe, the number of men away from home, therefore, increased in this period.[152] In turn, the population of towns grew too, in part the product of new openings, with the growth rate of Dar es Salaam, for example, quadrupling from an inter-war rate of 2% to 8%.[153] And remittances flooded into home areas, in North Kavirondo, to take one example, increasing from £177,000 in 1939 to £409,000 in 1944.[154] In the absence of consumer goods, scarce in time of war, region-wide inflation inevitably followed.[155]

In the post-war world, the pulse of colonialism quickened yet further, as imperial aims embraced new ambitions and the colonial presence, and the burdens it imposed, intensified.[156] This 'second colonial occupation' saw efforts both to shore up the legitimacy of the imperial project, and to harness invigorated colonial economies to the task of metropolitan recovery, a task haunted, inhibited and intensified, by growing colonial fears of environmental ruin. As ever, the experience of this quickened pulse was variably local, but was nonetheless widely felt.

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[150] Westcott, 'Sisal Industry', pp.445-55.
[151] Spencer, 'Settler Dominance', pp.504-5, p.512. Lonsdale, 'Depression', p.128. Westcott, 'Impact of the Second World War', p.147. Brennan, *Taifa*, pp.138-9. Lonsdale, 'KAU's Cultures', p.113.
[152] Giblin, *History of the Excluded*, p.109.
[153] Brennan, *Taifa*, p.117.
[154] Spencer, 'Settler Dominance', pp.511-12.
[155] Westcott, 'Impact of the Second World War', p.149. Anderson and Throup, 'Africans and Agricultural Production', p.341.
[156] D.A. Low and J. Lonsdale, 'Introduction: Towards the New Order', in D.A. Low and A. Smith, (eds.), *History of East Africa*, vol. III, (Oxford, 1976), pp.1-63. Darwin, *Empire Project*, pp.558-9.

As the war drew to a close, European empires across Africa concerned themselves with the need to make their colonies both 'productive and orderly', 'legitimate and efficient'. With this end in mind, France, convinced in light of its wartime experience of the empire's value, divided Africans into two categories, a small group of *évolues* and a much more numerous group of peasants. Planners hoped that the combination of the incorporation of *évolues* into metropolitan institutions, on the one hand, bringing African representatives to an assembly in Paris, and the abolition of forced labour, lower taxes and African production within their own communities, on the other, would make their empire both governable and profitable, securing an on-going association and France's world power status. For the British, meanwhile, no less convinced of empire's worth, different means served similar ends. While there would be no representation of Africans in metropolitan forums, constitutional reform within individual territories was central to this effort across the continent. From the mid-1940s, therefore, the administrations of Kenya and Tanganyika, like others across British Africa, sought to remake their collaborative bargains, white and black, initiating what became an on-going process of constitutional review and reform.[157]

To this end, the Kenyan administration, concerned by the power the war had put in their hands, tried to straighten the territory's irresponsible settler politicians, binding them with the disciplines of power, by placing ministerial portfolios in their hands for the first time.[158] And, animated by their anticipation of African post-war expectations, both governments granted a limited degree of power to Africans beyond the confines of indirect rule.[159] In Kenya, Eliud Mathu took his nominated seat in the Legislative Council in 1944, where he was joined by a further five members between 1947 and 1952, while in Tanganyika, Chiefs Abidel Shangali and Kidaha Makwaia took their

[157] Cooper, *Africa since 1940*, pp.40-9. Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*, Ch. 5.
[158] Berman, *Control and Crisis*, pp.282-7. D. Throup, *Economic and Social Origins of Mau Mau* (London, 1987), pp.35-52. R.M. Maxon, *Britain and Kenya's Constitutions, 1950-1960* (New Jersey, 2011), pp.22-9.
[159] Lonsdale, 'Depression and War', pp.130-1.

seats the following year, and saw their numbers double by 1948.[160] The first *election* of African members, however, would have to wait until 1957 in Kenya and 1958 in Tanganyika.[161]

The smallest of openings for Africans at the centre of the territories was accompanied, in turn, by halting efforts to reform local government, each with its own local history. In Kenya, the responsibilities of Local Native Councils, which had long (if geographically unevenly) provided space in local government for non-chiefs, were first expanded and, after 1950, given formal recognition in what were now called African District Councils, the members of which were, in theory, elected (although the Emergency delayed implementation).[162] On the other side of the border, local governments were now, similarly, expected to create space in government for 'Western educated' men, long considered by the colonial administrations as potentially disruptive elements in local society.[163]

In part, linking colonial centre and periphery, officials hoped that reformed local government would serve as a training ground for Africans in the responsible handling of power, an extended tutorial in administration, in preparation for the vague and very distant independence into which the British were now (rhetorically) committed to delivering their empire, a task given impetus in Tanganyika by the demands of the newly created United Nations Organisation, charged with overseeing British administration in place of the defunct League of Nations.[164] More immediately, as Arthur Creech Jones, the post-war Labour government's second Secretary of State for the Colonies, and (it was hoped) the 'great friend and champion of the colonial peoples and their welfare and destiny', suggested in a circular sent to the governors of the African territories in February 1947, local government reform was intimately connected to British post-war 'development' projects. A

[160] J. Spencer, *The Kenya African Union* (London, 1985), p.121. D. Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War and Decolonisation* (Cambridge, 2009), p.151. Hailey, *Survey*, p.303.
[161] K. Kyle, *The Politics of the Independence of Kenya* (Basingstoke, 1999), p.70. J. Iliffe, 'Breaking the Chain at the Weakest Link', in G.H. Maddox and J.L. Giblin, *In Search of a Nation* (Oxford, 2005), p.169.
[162] Hailey, *Survey*, pp.447-8. Hornsby, *Kenya*, p.42.
[163] A. Eckert, 'Useful Instruments of Participation? Local Government and Cooperatives in Tanzania, 1940s to 1970s', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol.40, No.1, (2007), p.99. Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development Policy*, p.120.
[164] Hunter, 'Languages of Politics', pp.176-7. Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism*, p.166.

democratic system of local government, he argued, was essential to ensure the co-operation of African people in the myriad projects of the energised imperial power.[165] 'Progress in agriculture', he wrote, 'cannot take place unless the people themselves can be induced to co-operate', and this 'process of inducement' could 'only be made effective through the agency of the native administrations.'[166] Legitimacy, internal and external, was held to require a new basis.

'Development' in the post-war years was itself was an evolving, contested, concept.[167] It was not, however, a new one. The assertion of 'trusteeship', the longstanding justification of British rule, contained within it (in thought if not always in deed) the imperative to develop Africa's people and resources beyond the level they might otherwise have occupied, while, as we have seen, the nagging need of colonial states for a material basis for their rule led to an obvious emphasis on economic development (felt rather unevenly) from the beginning of the century. Questions about the need for a more concerted development strategy, not least, it was hoped, to ease some of Britain's own economic difficulties, moreover, lingered in certain metropolitan circles across the interwar period, leading to the passage of the Colonial Development Act in 1929, although its impact proved to be limited, while from the 1920s, the possibility of applying science to the practice of development across Africa began to be systematically explored. At the heart of this effort was the *African Survey*, the collation and publication of which (in 1938) was one of a number of factors, imperial as much as African, pushing concerns about the welfare of Britain's distant subjects up the political agenda in the 1930s, a trend which culminated in the passing of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1940, a piece of legislation which enshrined the (new) principle that metropolitan money should be made available to boost peripheral living standards. Their long roots notwithstanding, in the period

[165] Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development Policy*, p.116. *East African Standard*, Letter Geo. Kariuki, 5th July 1946, p. supplement 'a'. *East African Standard*, Letter 'Olenguruone Settlers', 19th July 1946, p.13.
[166] British National Archives, CO 533/567/4, (Agricultural Policy in African Areas), Agricultural Productivity in Africa, Despatch Dated 22nd February 1947, From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governors of the African Territories', pp.2-3.
[167] See e.g. Cooper, *Decolonisation and African Society*, pp.205-6.

after the Second World War the intensity and scale of colonial development ambitions and subsequent efforts increased markedly.[168]

In these early post-war years, it was, above all, the spectre of ecological crisis, a nightmare which had begun to find nooks in interwar imaginations, which was foremost in the minds of colonial administrators and the multiplying technical staffs of the two territories, and on which these more concerted efforts focused.[169] As one Tanganyikan official commented: 'Once the necessity for war-time production is no longer a first priority[,] the rehabilitation of all native lands must be our watchword.'[170] Virtuous production and wanton destruction were two sides of the same coin.

To combat the nightmare of encroaching desertification, Tanganyika's Ten-Year Development Plan of 1946 contained five regional schemes aimed at conserving the soil, in Mubulu, Usukuma, Kondoa, Usambara and Uluguru, ramped up and better funded versions of plans first formulated in the late 1930s. 'Where there is no vision' ran the epigram to the outline of the Usambara scheme, borrowing from the Book of Proverbs to give voice to the spirit of the age, 'the people perish'.[171] The most ambitious of these schemes, focussed on Sukumaland in Lake Province, Tanganyika's post-war social laboratory, and aimed to minimise pressure on what were thought to be overcrowded areas of land by reducing and reorganising the human and cattle populations, and pushing animal husbandry and soil conservation techniques designed to ensure the fertility of the land and the stability of African agriculture. To this end, orders were issued by the Native Authority, reorganised with this task in mind, which made the tie-ridging of a minimum of half an acre of land per household compulsory in 1946, an onerous burden increased to a full acre in 1949. In the early

[168] See H. Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development and the Project of Scientific Knowledge, 1870-1950* (Chicago, 2011), M. Havinden and D. Meredith, *Colonialism and Development: Britain and its Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960* (London, 1993), Chs.7-10. J. Lewis, *Empire State Building: War and Welfare in Kenya, 1925-52* (Oxford, 2000), Ch.1, F. Cooper, *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge, 2002), pp.30-2, M.M. Beukekom and D.L. Hodgson, 'Lessons Learned? Development Experiences in the Late Colonial Period', *Journal of African History*, Vol.41, No.1, (2000), pp.29-33.
[169] Anderson, 'Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography and Drought', pp.321-43. Anderson and Throup, 'Africans and Agricultural Production', p.343.
[170] Cited in Iliffe, *Agricultural Change*, p.34.
[171] BNA, CO 691/190/8, (Development of Tanganyika: Scheme for the development of West Usambara), A Development Scheme for West Usambara, 1945. The quote comes from Proverbs, xxix.18.

1950s, both the extent of these demands and efforts to enforce them were increased and intensified, and controversial destocking regulations were introduced to supplement them.[172] Underpinning all aspects of the scheme was an acceptance on the part of local officials that coercion was the necessary basis of progress: as Creech Jones wrote to the Governors of Britain's African territories in mid-1948, if the 'necessity of ensuring that proper methods of cultivation are adopted and the soil is conserved' could 'only be achieved by the use of compulsory powers, then the native administrations will have to take such powers, since neither they themselves nor the Government can stand by and see the soil ruined and the wellbeing and development of the people prejudiced.'[173] The African must be saved from himself.[174]

The same aim and understanding animated officials in Kenya, who likewise feared that expanded production, principally in those areas touching white settlement, and underpinned, they similarly held, by the greed and growing selfish individualism of African cultivators, had brought the reserves to the brink of social disintegration and ecological catastrophe. With the aim of reversing these trends, and ignoring lands more distant from Kenya's white centre, they planned major soil conservation projects and attempted to revive 'traditional' land authorities, both as the means by which they hoped to create popular support for their agricultural campaign, and as a challenge to the (alleged) individualism they so detested. As in Tanganyika's Lake Province, such support was hard to come by, and their efforts came to rest very heavily on coercion, the mandatory communal building of terraces, supervised by a new generation of chiefs, thought by officials to be more capable of playing this role than their predecessors. The hope proved to be forlorn, and in 1947 Central Province erupted into violent protest.[175]

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[172] Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development Policy*, Ch.3.
[173] BNA, CO 533/567/4, Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governors of the African Territories, 13th July 1948, p.2.
[174] Iliffe, *Agricultural Change in Modern Tanzania*, p.34.
[175] Berman, *Control and Crisis*, pp.274-8. Throup, *Origins*, Chs.4&7. A. Thurston, *Smallholder Agriculture in Colonial Kenya: The Official Mind and the Swynnerton Plan* (Cambridge, 1987), pp.20-1. Anderson and Throup, 'Africans and Agricultural Production', p.343. Anderson, *Eroding the Commons*, Ch.7.

In the immediate post-war years, official encouragement for *African* commodity production in these areas was put firmly on hold.[176] In Kenya, however, the geography of land rehabilitation, bordering the white heart of the colony, was intimately linked to a further aspect of imperial development plans: expanded production.

Post-war, London looked at what remained of the empire with a greedy eye. Military victory had hardly eased imperial crisis: devastated by the conflict, Britain hoped that the empire would provide the raw materials to power metropolitan recovery. The sterling crisis of 1947 made it more important still, not only as a source of agricultural produce, but as the earner of dollars, a prop to the beleaguered currency.[177] Both impulses were famously given expression in the ill-fated Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme ('the Project' as the territory's governor fondly referred to it), which aimed to both address the world shortage of vegetable fats and to earn dollar income through the largescale mechanised production of groundnuts in Tanganyika's agriculturally unpromising Southern Province.[178]

Buoyed by their wartime success, white producers in both Kenya and Tanganyika made private interest a public good, claiming the indispensability of European agriculture in this quest and the wider task of economic development: buoyant white agriculture would pay for the provision of welfare services to the African population. Expanded production was, then, nothing less than their patriotic duty, as both imperial subjects and residents of East Africa.[179]

Their arguments proved exceptionally persuasive. Philip Mitchell, once Tanganyika's liberal chief secretary and, after 1944, the conservative governor of Kenya, was quick to describe white

[176] Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', pp.406-7.
[177] Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development Policy*, pp.197-9. Darwin, *Unfinished Empire*, pp.350-4. Havinden and Meredith, *Colonialism and Development*, Ch.10.
[178] M. Rizzo, 'What was Left of the Groundnut Scheme? Development Disaster and Labour Markets in Southern Tanganyika, 1946-52', *Journal of Agrarian Change*, Vol.6, No.2, (2006), pp.205-28. Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development Policy*, pp.208-16. BNA, CO 691/199, (Tanganyika: Original Correspondence), Provincial Commissioners' Conference, Dar es Salaam, June 1947, Appendix A: Address to the Provincial Commissioners' Conference by His Excellency the Governor, June 1947, p.3.
[179] Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', p.406. Hunter, 'Languages of Politics', pp.113-115.

settlers as the 'keystone of the arch' in British East Africa.[180] His Tanganyikan counterpart, in a similar vein, told the territory's provincial commissioners in 1946 that 'In planning the economics of post-war Tanganyika it is essential to aim at increasing the general wealth of this country', without which 'we shall never be able to afford the social services, the welfare services and the general amenities which we must have if we are to raise the general standard of living all round.' He was clear that they could not simply rely on 'Colonial Development Fund money', but 'must find enough money locally to pay our way'.[181] The Colonial Secretary, in turn, accepted that this meant that 'we should press on with economic development by all suitable means'. So long, therefore, as 'the interests of the African inhabitants are not likely to be impaired', a judgement for the cool white heads of the administration, rather than their (presumably) short-sighted subjects, he argued, further white settlement should be allowed to take place in the territory.[182] The increased emphasis placed on expanded production after 1947 only intensified this view. After the end of the war, therefore, new settlers continued to arrive in Kenya, their numbers rising from 23,000 in 1939, to 42,000 in 1953 and 61,000 in 1960, while in Tanganyika, the white population doubled in the decade after 1948 to 20,498, further land was alienated and significant official energy devoted to the questions of how best to use the 'ex-enemy' estates, once again vacated in the course of Anglo-German conflict, and to white land tenure and its length, the essential basis of productive agriculture.[183]

As they sought to expand production, Kenya's settlers used ecological worries as a political weapon, an old trick first employed in the 1930s, making a determined connection between their economic vitality and the African environment. Poor African land management, they claimed,

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[180] Cited in Spencer, 'Settler Dominance', p.513. Throup, *Origins*, p.42, p.44.
[181] BNA, CO 691/199, Provincial Commissioners' Conference, Dar es Salaam, June 1946, Appendix A: Address by the Governor to Provincial Commissioners' Conference, June 1946, p.4.
[182] BNA, CO 691/199, Announcement by the Governor of Tanganyika in the Legislative Council, 7th March 1946, p.2.
[183] Smith, 'The Europeans', p.450. Anderson, *Histories*, pp.83-84. Hornsby, *Kenya*, p.55 & p.62. Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, p.164. Giblin, *History of the Excluded*, p.222. Hunter, 'Languages of Politics', pp.116-7. T. Spear, *Mountain Farmers: Moral Economies of Land and Agricultural Development in Arusha and Meru* (Oxford, 1997), Ch.11.

threatened, first, the fertility of both European and African farms, and so their productive potential, and, subsequently, European lands with floods of environmental refugees fleeing ruined black soil, reinforcing the concerns of the administration about African cash-crop production.[184] 'D-Day' (in Mitchell's melodramatic words) had arrived.[185]

The greatest danger to their expanded production, however, appeared to be posed by the Africans in their midst: the squatters resident on white farms. The inherent contradiction between the logics of the two agrarian systems had become apparent in the economic growth of the 1920s as white and black production increased. Both the state and the settlers came increasingly to see the squatters as a 'menace', an obstacle to progressive agriculture, engaging extensive, inefficient farming and depleting the soil, simultaneously obstructing and threatening the future of white agriculture. The Resident Native Labour Ordinance of 1937 put control of the squatter population in the hands of white controlled district councils, giving them powers to further limit stock holdings, the land they were able to cultivate and to increase the number of days they were required to labour. Anticipating squatter losses, the colonial administration made provision for a limited number of squatter families on land in unhopeful Olengurone in the early 1940s, intending to create a model scheme of efficient African farming, and where new agricultural rules were rigorously enforced and routinely resented. For the majority of squatters who remained on white farms, war intervened to delay the implementation of this legislation; revitalised white patrons in the Rift Valley soon, however, turned on their black clients.

By September 1944, trying on their new authority, the chairman of all (white) district councils had agreed that squatter livestock should be removed from the White Highlands. In the Rift Valley, new less favourable squatter contracts were introduced soon after, marking the beginning of a concerted settler campaign to reduce squatters to a mere labour force. Deprived of the opportunities of independent commodity production, for these families the riches of war rapidly

[184] Anderson, 'Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography and Drought', pp.323-4. Throup, *Origins*, p.4. Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', p.417.
[185] BNA, CO 533/537/12 (Soil Conservation: Machakos Scheme), Broadcast Talk Given by H.E. Sir Philip Mitchell, Governor of Kenya, 27th December 1944, p.2.

gave way to the indigence of peace. Average squatter household income here fell from 1,400 shillings in 1942 to a mere 300 shillings just four years later.[186] In response, some chose to stay and fight; others drifted out of the White Highlands and into Nairobi and other reserves, threatening the tribal sanctity of the colonial imagination.[187]

In the diaspora of Kenya's black heart, a whole way of life was under sustained attack. To the north-west, in Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu, however, European farmers lacked the confidence of their Rift Valley counterparts in their ability to turn their squatters into a pliant labour force. Concerned about the implications of such a move for their own budding prosperity, white wills faltered as the time for action came. The future of their tenants looked somewhat more hopeful.[188]

Away from the white farms, the increased imperial emphasis placed on the need for economic development after 1947 pushed the colonial governments to rethink, once again, the demands they made of African agriculture, and to push for expanded African production.[189] To this end, development plans were drawn up for northern Tanganyika's pastoralists, and launched in 1951 as the Masai Development Plan, with the dual aim of building consent for the colonial project by increasing local living standards and expanding production to aid imperial recovery. This consent would, as ever, be built on coercion. British planners hoped to remake Masai life in what they took to be the image of modernity, overcoming what they now considered to be cultural barriers to development, creating 'modern ranchers', who would contribute to the economic life of the territory by the sale of stock. To this end, they planned to 'clear tsetse-infested bush', 'build more permanent water supplies' and 'experiment with grazing controls and fodder production'. The plan was not very successful.[190]

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[186] Kanogo, *Squatters*, Ch.4. Anderson, *Histories*, p.25. Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', pp.417-8.
[187] T. Parsons, 'Being Kikuyu in Meru: Challenging the Tribal Geography of Colonial Kenya', *Journal of African History*, Vol.53, No.1, (2012), pp.65-86. Anderson, *Histories*, pp.25-6, p.189.
[188] Youe, 'Settler Capital', pp.393-418.
[189] Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development Policy*, pp.216-8. Cooper, *Decolonisation and African Society*, pp.204-12.
[190] D.L.Hodgson, *Once Intrepid Warriors: Gender, Ethnicity and the Cultural Politics of Masai Development* (Bloomington, 2001), Ch.3.

In Tanganyika's Lake Province, a new emphasis was placed on 'economic' development after 1948, when the sharply named 'Lake Province Increased Cotton and Food Producing Scheme' was instituted. The initiative was designed to increase output of cotton very largely by means of the ultimately coercive, and by now familiar, increased supervision of African agriculture by a significantly expanded technical staff. Keen to shake the drive for expanded production free of the image of the alleged destruction of the 1930s, officials expressed their belief that patriotic production would be facilitated by the improved techniques of 'environmental' development.[191] Their counterparts in Usambara, in the north-east of Tanganyika, were similarly hopeful that saved soils (initially conceived as an end in itself) would improve the yields of fledgling local coffee production.[192]

In Central Kenya, the imperial emphasis on expanded production met local imperatives. Faced by protest and non-co-operation, agricultural officers, and increasingly the Provincial Administration, came after the unrest of 1947, to hope that encouraging expanded production amongst 'progressive' farmers through incentives such as the prospect of licenses to cultivate high value cash-crops, notably coffee (a crop being shaken free, despite settler protest, of racial privilege), the provision of loans, and individual land titles, would help overcome the resistance that had met their coercive efforts to enforce soil conservation rules.[193] In developing the resources of the region the good and wealthy were to be separated from the bad and poor.

Concerned with the development prospects of East Africa as a whole, in 1953 the British established a regional taskforce, the East African Royal Commission, to examine how production could be expanded and standards of living raised, even as the population increased. While the commissioners travelled across East Africa collecting evidence, however, planning to remake the colonial economy, and African life, on apparently more rational grounds, bravely cutting a path

[191] Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development Policy*, pp.216-21.
[192] Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, pp.161-4.
[193] Thurston, *Smallholder Agriculture*, pp.30-31. Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', pp.406-7. Kershaw, *Mau Mau*, pp.167-8. Berman, *Control and Crisis*, pp.279-80.

through cultural and racial obstacles to free-market development, rising commodity prices stimulated the further expansion of African production.[194]

For all the hopes of local officials, it was the increasing price of cotton, supplemented by the growing use of ox-ploughs, which led to the major expansion of cotton production, from 38,000 bales in 1950 to 161,000 bales in 1961, in Tanganyika's Lake Province. As in the 1930s, economic and ecological imperatives were in competition, not complementary, and increased output was achieved by the placing of ever more land under the crop, rather than better land management.[195] In other areas, this expansion was unencumbered by conservation. In Rungwe district in Tanganyika, production of rice reached 5,900 tons in 1954, more than doubling its wartime peak, as prices went up.[196] On Kilimanjaro, the average income of coffee growers increased from 750/- per annum in 1950 to 1,600/- a mere five years later, as the price of coffee increased from £328 to £582 per ton between 1948 and 1954.[197] And in the Gusii highlands, maize production continued to grow and coffee boomed. Between 1950 and 1955 a further 2,000 acres were placed under the latter as its price doubled.[198] There were opportunities in peace as well as war, although their distribution was far from even.

At the same time, the number of migrant labourers often increased too, even as some official effort was put into labour 'stabilisation' policies, designed to bring labourers with their families to their workplace.[199] After the war, the percentage of men absent from Njombe, for example, was higher than in the earlier period, as the choice of destination increased and larger numbers headed as far as the Rhodesias and South Africa, leaving, according to the 1957 census,

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[194] *East African Royal Commission Report* (London, 1955), p.xi. Berman, *Control and Crisis*, pp.387-8.
[195] Schuknecht, *British Colonial Development Policy*, pp.216-58.
[196] Gulliver *Land Tenure and Social Change*, p.13.
[197] Hunter, 'Languages of Politics', pp.109-10. A. Eckert, 'Comparing Coffee Production in Cameroon and Tanganyika, *c*.1900-1960s: Land, Labour and Politics', in W.G. Clarence-Smith and S. Topik, (eds.), *The Global Coffee Economy in Africa, Asia and Latin America* (Cambridge, 2003), p.300,
[198] Maxon, *Conflict and Accommodation*, pp.132-37.
[199] L. White, 'Separating the Men from the Boys: Constructions of Gender, Sexuality and Terrorism in Central Kenya, 1939-1959', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol.23, No.1, (1990), pp.6-9. Giblin, *History of the Excluded*, p.138. Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism*, pp.128-9. Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, pp.165-6.

only 569 males aged over 16 for every 1000 females.[200] Amongst the Ngoni, the percentage of men away from their home area likewise increased from around one quarter in the inter-war period to around one third by 1953.[201] The story was similar in Western Kenya.[202] And in areas such as Tanganyika's Rungwe district, increased cash-crop production put pressure on the available land, depriving younger men of access, a subject taken up in the following section. In turn, the migration of young men from this district was much higher than from neighbouring districts less involved in rice production.[203] In Kenya's Central Province, likewise, the percentage of men engaged in wage-labour both grew and changed its profile, as increasingly older men, short of land, reluctantly took their place. Nyeri district, therefore, produced the highest per capita number of wage workers of all Kenyan districts in both 1943 and 1947.[204]

The impact of the social and, above all, economic forces associated with colonial rule, then, developed contingently and unevenly across the colonial period. From the earliest days of the British and German presence, young men were drawn, by coercion, taxation and opportunity, into labouring for the state and, increasingly, on European plantations and farms as well as for Indian traders. At the same time, the European presence, like that of the Swahili traders before them, widened markets in African agricultural produce and stimulated, in certain favoured areas, the production of household surplus for sale as well as new export crops, while placing obstacles in the path of the African cultivation of others. The colonial state, in need of a material basis for its rule, encouraged these developments, and with a new vigour in the 1930s as external shock provoked existential crisis, widening the geographical areas pulled into commodity production. Imperial efforts to recover from a second, graver, crisis, in the 1940s tied the colonial periphery to the metropole, led the colonial state to seek to remake its collaborative bargains and, alongside rising commodity

[200] Giblin, *History of the Excluded*, pp.109-11.
[201] P.H. Gulliver, *Labour Migration in a Rural Economy* (London, 1955), pp.1-2, p.14.
[202] M. Carotenuto, '*Riwruok E Teko*: Cultivating Identity in Colonial and Postcolonial Kenya', *Africa Today*, Vol.53, No.2, (2006), p.56.
[203] Gulliver, *Land Tenure and Social Change*, pp.36-7.
[204] D. Peterson, 'Writing in Revolution: Independent Schooling and Mau Mau in Nyeri', in E.S. Atieno Odhiambo and J. Lonsdale, (eds.), *Mau Mau and Nationhood* (Oxford, 2003), p.84.

prices, increased both production demands and calls for labour, whilst also intensifying the demanding presence of the colonial state as white worries about the future of the land grew.

Three points, each in tension with the others, one local, one territorial and one regional, can be drawn here. The first is to emphasise the diverse impact of the European presence. There was no single experience of colonialism. These territories were patchwork quilts, the impact of widening markets in produce and labour hugely uneven, across both time and space, their ebb as important as their flow. Nonetheless, and secondly, if we take a step back and look at the patterns of these patchworks, we can see distinctively Kenyan and Tanganyikan designs, contingencies which were to form an essential part of the background against which visions of community were conjured, and which, to look ahead in the argument, became increasingly important as the constitutional changes of the 1940s tied the regions into single *African* political units. In Kenya, geographically concentrated European settlement created a white bloc in the centre of the colony; in turn, the intrusions of colonialism were felt most in Kenya's Central Province with its relatively expansive provision of education, favoured access to markets, the colony's largest city, and an unparalleled, and imperilled, diaspora. Together they formed Kenya's two-tone heart. This gave the colony an obvious centre. Away from this area, the social and economic forces of colonialism became increasingly intrusive as the pulse of colonialism quickened, but were never quite as sharp. In Tanganyika, in contrast, a more dispersed, 'polycentric' pattern emerged, lacking a definite centre. There, regions of white and black export production were surrounded by food producing regions and served by migrant labour drawn from distant and less environmentally favoured areas.[205] The territory was, in short, heartless. And thirdly, and finally (belatedly abandoning our metaphor), for all their unevenness, by the 1940s the intrusion of these forces had generated a common sense of disorder across the region.[206] This is subject of the next section.

[205] Iliffe, *Modern History*, p.311.
[206] Berman, 'Ordeal of Modernity', pp.1-14. Lonsdale, 'Anti-Colonial Nationalism', pp.324-6.

V

Colonial officials, intent in the 1940s on recreating a lost social harmony, a restoration of natural order in the face of expanding markets, imagined the existence of a 'merrie Africa' that had, in reality, never existed. Social relations across the region had always been marked by inequalities, blown open in time of famine, and the subject of critical examination.[207] In the colonial period, however, as markets in labour and produce widened, these inequalities grew. Social and economic change, on different timescales in different places, disrupted always disputed moral economies, widely held views of social norms and obligations, the legitimate bases of inequality, and the relationships of class, generation and gender they governed.[208] In the wake of this change - mirroring the economic geography of the region, sharper in some places than others - by the late 1940s life across East Africa was characterised by a widespread sense of disorder.[209]

It was amongst the squatters on the farms of the Rift Valley that this ordeal was most intense. There, men understood a reputable adulthood to lie in the self-mastery, *wiathi*, of (male) household heads prudently managing their property and progeny.[210] The renewed assault on squatter families in the 1940s was understood to subvert this ideal, to condemn proudly independent householders to slavery. Likewise, the agricultural rules imposed on the displaced squatters at Olenguruone, which prevented a householder from dividing his land between his sons, threatened both the independence of household heads and a respectable adulthood for their sons,

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[207] R.D. Waller, 'Pastoral Poverty in Historical Perspective', in D.M. Anderson and V. Broch-Due, (eds.), *The Poor Are Not Us: Poverty and Pastoralism in Eastern Africa* (Oxford, 1999), p.34. Throup, *Origins*, pp.78-9. Bravman, *Making Ethnic Ways*, Ch.1. Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', pp.337-8. D.R. Peterson, 'Morality Plays: Marriage, Church Courts, and Colonial Agency in Central Tanganyika, *ca.*1876-1928, *The American Historical Review*, Vol.111, No.4, (2006), pp.990-5. Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, Ch.2. Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau*, Ch.1.

[208] E.P. Thompson, 'The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century', *Past and Present*, Vol.50, (1971), p.79. Berman, 'Palimpsest of Contradictions', pp.24-6. Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', pp.315-504. Lonsdale, 'Ethnic Patriotism and Markets in African History', p.15.

[209] Lonsdale, 'Authority, Gender and Violence', pp.52-3.

[210] Peterson, 'Writing', p.84. Hobson, 'Moral Agency', pp.456-70.

wiathi present and future.[211] Their ordeal was conveyed by Senior Chief Koinange, a fixture of Kikuyu politics since the early 1920s, in a 1946 petition to Creech Jones. 'Man', he complained, 'is compelled to sell his goats and sheep to divorce his wives, and is forced in [the] Olenguruone and Rift Valley areas to denounce his fatherly right to his children in order to limit their family to the area of allotment given to these slave squatters.' The squatters themselves spoke similarly in their own petition, fearing that they were being 'reduced to the status of slaves', and, therefore, in a social sense 'gradually exterminated'.[212] Their very future was in doubt.

Household heads in Bukoba resisting the new Coffee Rules in the mid-1930s would well have understood the concerns of their counterparts in Olenguruone a decade later. While around Bukoba these regulations generated rumours of white plans to drive Africans from their land and into wage slavery, however, away from the Rift Valley the prospect of social extinction was not quite so sharp before the mid-1950s.[213] The wider opportunities and dangers of colonial rule, nonetheless, generated a sense of disruption as they threatened to undermine the reciprocal relationships that made possible a respectable life. Privileged access to the state, for example, could subvert the reciprocities of patron and client and underpin the accumulation of the powerful. Around Bukoba, in pre-colonial times the *bakama*, local rulers, had the authority to confer rights to the labour and tribute of a few contiguous household farms to another member of the royal lineage, creating *nyarubanja* estates. Such a landlord fulfilled the role of a patron to his new tenants, a potential defence against over-mighty royal authority. Under German and British rule, however, *bakama* used their links with the state to create *nyarubanja* for themselves, collecting their tribute as landlords in addition to general taxation. While only around 10% of their subjects laboured under this tenancy arrangement, it was nonetheless a source of significant local discontent.[214] The writer of a memorandum to the East African Royal Commission in 1953, for example, complained of how such landlords 'become rich through our *shambas* and that we serve them, feeding their children and

[211] Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', p.418.
[212] Cited in Lonsdale, 'Authority, Gender and Violence', pp.57-9.
[213] Weiss, 'Sacred Trees', pp.153-6.
[214] Curtis, 'Smaller is Better', pp.326-8.

wives while our children and our wives die of hunger. It is our wives who weed the *shambas*', the writer concluded, 'the harvests of which they do not eat since they cannot help themselves'. Virtuous labour went unrewarded. The system, he argued, was akin to slavery and 'It is not just to keep a human being enslaved'. The *bakama*, the writer held, had used the arbitrary power of the state to satisfy their own appetites at the expense of their subjects, exercising power unencumbered by obligation.[215]

Cash-crop production, moreover, generated tensions between patrons and clients and fathers and sons. Taita arap Towett, a man we shall hear a good deal from over the course of the following chapters, pointed towards the disruptions to both created by the development of commercial farming around Kericho. The arrival of Indian traders in the area in the early years of colonial rule, he explained, had stimulated the commercial production of maize, which continued to grow as 'More and more maize each year became the policy of the Kipsigis'. 'After the last war', he went on:

… those who went to fight came back and to their utter surprise they found their neighbours having established themselves as land lords [sic] with ploughs, oxen, ox-carts, bicycles and such other things. They too wanted to acquire land but there was little land left for them. They could only get little plots. They began quarrelling with their neighbours for having appropriated more land and even what they ought not to have claimed. This resulted in many cases in the Native Tribunal Courts and in putting the famous Mauritius thorn round each man's plot.

In the post-war world, he concluded, 'Brothers fight daily in the African Courts over the question of land ownership' to satisfy their 'selfish' desire for their own plot of land.[216]

In the midst of Kilimanjaro's post-war coffee boom, such tensions were even sharper, tensions reflected in the incredible 278% increase in the number of civil cases heard by the local courts, a large proportion of which related to land, in the two-year period between 1951 and

[215] BNA, CO 892/10/3, (East African Royal Commission: Memorandum from the Public: Individual African Submissions), *Memorandum* Godrey s/o Mukorila, Gera Kiziba, Bukoba to the East African Royal Commission, 21st May 1953, pp.1-2.
[216] BNA, CO 892/5/4, (East African Royal Commission: Memorandum from the Public: General African Submissions), Memorandum from Taita arap Towett to the East African Royal Commission, 14th April 1953, pp.4-5.

1953.[217] And in Kenya's Central Province, the situation was more fraught still. There, land was held by *mbari* sub-clans, 'mosaics of patrilineal descent, affinal alliance and unequal patronage'.[218] Within these sub-clans, the division of land had always been unequal. In the nineteenth century, it seems, it was acknowledged that different *githaku* had made different contributions to the construction of the *mbari*, and were rewarded with differing amounts of land. Sons, moreover, inherited the land of their fathers, but not necessarily equally, to avoid turning it into small parcels. The land short might, in turn, become *ahoi*, tenants, of the larger landowners.[219] Cash-crop production and demographic change greatly increased this stratification. A rising population led to the sub-division of the plots of small land holders, leaving land sufficient only for subsistence. At the same time, larger landowners placed an increasing amount of land under cash-crops, in Nyeri up from 40% of the average household farm in 1931 to 57% in 1943 as wattle production grew, reducing the land available to their sons and clients.[220] In this context, accusations of sorcery swirled, an indication of rural tensions, while courts filled with land cases. In only two years, between 1949 and 1951, court fees paid in Kiambu increased by 85%, from £13,000 to £24,000 (or, to put the figure in context, roughly two thirds of the value of the district's legal vegetable exports a decade earlier).[221] Environmental initiatives in the second half of the 1940s added to this stratification, as the land poor toiled under the weight of soil conservation campaigns while the rich, looking forward to the prospect of the introduction of valuable coffee to their household farms, and supplementing their farm income with trading ventures, could afford to pay others to labour for them.[222] Wealth no longer appeared fertile. While a booming rural capitalism saw the wealthy prosper, for the poorest, starved of access to land, *wiathi* appeared increasingly beyond their reach.[223]

[217] Hunter, 'Languages of Politics', p.168.
[218] Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', p.336.
[219] Kershaw, *Mau Mau*, p.53, pp.58-9.
[220] Kershaw, *Mau Mau*, pp. 147 -157. Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', pp.358-63. Peterson, 'Writing', p.83.
[221] M.P.K. Sorrenson, *Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country* (London, 1967), pp.78-9.
[222] Lonsdale, 'Authority, Gender and Violence', p.56. Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', pp.420-1. Kershaw, *Mau Mau*, pp.167-9. Berman, *Control and Crisis*, pp.220-3. Robertson, *Trouble Showed the Way*, pp.80-1.
[223] Kershaw, *Mau Mau*, pp.165-71. Peterson, 'Writing', p.84.

In Rungwe district in southern Tanganyika, the expanded production of rice, a land hungry crop, in the final two decades of colonial rule shaped tensions between fathers and their sons. P.H. Gulliver, the government sociologist, noted in the mid-1950s that the increasing commercial value of land had made fathers unwilling to cede land rights to their sons, content instead to profit from their labour, leaving men under thirty working for their seniors and dependent for their subsistence upon the farms of their fathers and brothers. In this situation of lengthy dependence, Gulliver noted, 'the valued independence of the young Nyakyusa is severely restricted and it seems that tensions are beginning to arise between brothers because of this. Sons are blamed for not doing their share of the family cultivation', he wrote, while 'fathers are blamed for giving inadequate shares in crops and crop incomes'.[224] Cash-cropping was undermining the reciprocities of generation.

Missions and schools were a further source of generational tensions, calling into question the control of fathers over their progeny. In the early years of colonial rule in particular, the emphasis of missionaries in Kenya's Central Province on reaching the young was looked on with suspicion and resentment by parents who regarded it as an effort to capture their children's loyalties, and who saw the willingness of missions to harbour runaway children as a collusion in youthful rebellion, the subversion of proper order.[225] Over the longer term, education appeared to many to create alternative sources of authority, further undermining the authority of elders. As a correspondent in *Ramogi* put it in early 1948, the educated were 'always trying to show off and pretending to know much about everything. When one happened to know a little English', the writer complained, 'he is liable to misbehave to anybody superior to him.'[226]

Missionaries were far from the only colonial agents accused of attempting to 'capture the youth': migrant labour caused similar concerns.[227] Elders amongst the Ngoni, to take one example, grumbled in the 1950s that the physical distance between their rural homeland and the workplaces

[224] Gulliver, *Land Tenure and Social Change*, p.36.
[225] Clough, *Fighting Two Sides*, p.26.
[226] Kenya National Archives, (African Opinions as Expressed in the Kenyan Press), PC/NKU/2/27/34, *Ramogi*, 15th January 1948.
[227] N. wa Thiong'o, *Petals of Blood* (London, 1977), p.51.

of their sons reduced their control over their offspring.[228] On similar grounds, across the region, towns were feared as 'refuge for the wicked', and young men labouring there were routinely scorned as *wahuni*, yobs or hooligans.[229] Giving expression to this, Senior Chief Koinange told the Social Welfare Committee of the Kiambu Local Native Council in 1946 of the necessity of counteracting the lure of the colonial capital, and so 'of the need of establishing several centres in the District where young folks could entertain themselves and return to their homes at night instead of going to seek such entertainment in Nairobi, where they may be absent from homes for some time.'[230]

Control over labour and wages was also a vexed issue. In the Taita Hills of the nineteenth century, to take one example, the labour of young men, especially as herders, was understood to mark their contribution to the building of the wealth of the wider lineage. In turn, fathers reciprocated by providing bridewealth, enabling their sons to marry and become, in their turn, responsible adults. Migrant labour, however, put a more 'fluid form' of wealth, cash, directly into the hands of young men, putting this relationship under strain. Elders tried to assert their control over their offspring's income, initially with some success, 'grooming' their young sons to hand over their wages, making a connection with the established obligations of youth. Over time, however, their ability to exercise this control was challenged and declined.[231] Similarly, in Kenya's Central Province, elder men encouraged their sons into waged work in the early twentieth century, keen to ensure that they continued to make a contribution to household accumulation as raiding was curtailed and herding needs declined. In turn, the evidence they gave to the Labour Commission of 1912/13 suggests that young men used their wages to undercut elders' control of marriage and

[228] Gulliver, *Labour Migration*, p.41.
[229] KNA, PC/NKU/2/27/34, *Gikuyu*, 9th September 1948. J. Iliffe, *Honour in African History* (Cambridge, 2005), p.281. Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', p.357. A. Burton, *African Underclass: Urbanisation, Crime and Colonial Order in Dar es Salaam, 1919-61* (Oxford, 2005).
[230] KNA, PC/Cent/2/1/13, (Kiambu Local Native Council, 9th February 1944-27th July 1950), Minutes of a Meeting of the Social Welfare Committee of the Kimabu Local Native Council, 23rd April 1946, p.1.
[231] Bravman, *Making Ethnic Ways*, Ch.4.

household formation.[232] This subversion of the social order rankled, and in the 1940s, chiefs from this region expressed concern about the damage being done to what they took to be the proper social hierarchy, complaining that while youths who had served in the military 'had received rises in pay and rises in rank', the 'dignity and emoluments of Chiefs had not increased', despite the additional burdens placed on them by war.[233]

While elders continued to worry about youthful subversion of the proper social order, by the 1940s the ability of youths to undermine their control of marriage had declined markedly.[234] Monetization led to the inflation of bridewealth, the fee paid to the family of a bride by the groom, driving up the cost of marriage: cash, unlike stock, did not reproduce itself.[235] Cash-crop production, moreover, made the labour of juniors more valuable, and encouraged fathers to delay the marriage of their sons in order to profit from their sweat. In Bukoba, for example, the heart of Tanganyika's 1920s African boom, the Acting Provincial Commissioner noted caustically in 1927 that 'As a district prospers so do the old men endeavour to raise the amount of their daughter's dowry', and African and white thoughts began to turn to the possibility of regulating rising bridewealth costs.[236] In the Gusii highlands, expanding production in the 1940s had the same effect, leading an anthropologist to observe that poor men were having to delay marriage until they were 40 years old.[237] And the wages and remittances that flooded into East Africa in the 1940s drove inflation more generally, putting marriage out of reach for many young men who stayed in the reserves.[238] By the mid-1940s, the rising cost of bridewealth was a regional crisis and the source of much bitter comment.[239]

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[232] Kershaw, *Mau Mau*, pp.120-1. Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', p.356.
[233] KNA, PC/Cent/2/1/13, Minutes of a Meeting of the Kiambu Local Native Council Held at Kiambu on 3rd, 4th & 5th July, 1944, p.7.
[234] Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', p.358.
[235] Kershaw, *Mau Mau*, p.94.
[236] Tanzania National Archives, 215/170, Letter Acting Provincial Commissioner Bukoba to Chief Secretary, 4th January 1927, p.1.
[237] B.L. Shadle, 'Bridewealth and Female Consent: Marriage Disputes in African Courts, Gusiiland, Kenya', *Journal of African History*, Vol.44, No.2, (2003), p.247.See also Peterson, 'Writing', p.84.
[238] Anderson and Throup, 'African Agricultural Production', p.341.
[239] Brennan, *Taifa*, p.129. See also KNA, PC/NKU/2/27/34, (African Opinions as Expressed in the Kenyan Press).

It was above all gender relations that were put under strain by colonial change. The absence of migrant labourers from home generated marital tensions. In Njombe, for example, the question of when the wife of a migrant labourer could be properly said to have been deserted and therefore be free to make new relationships exercised the local administration confronted by growing complaints and pressures on their courts.[240] Focussing on the same question, the 1926 Songea annual report noted that 'The chiefs have now decided to adopt the following procedure. All their people have been informed that they are allowed to leave their wives for from 6 to 12 months only. If they return within the period mentioned' and found they had cause to complain about their wives, 'the Courts will assist them'. If, however, 'the husband remains away for 3 or 6 years…and during this time the wives complain of want of food or clothing, the Courts will support her complaint' and 'a separation will be granted and any dowry paid will not be reclaimable.'[241] The law did little to resolve marital tensions, however, and in 1953 the government sociologist observed that 54% of cases heard by the area's courts related to marriage, well above the already striking territorial average of 46%.[242]

Distant husbands, in turn, worried about the conduct of their wives and sought ways of maintaining their influence at home in their absence. A. Majatta, a soldier serving abroad, for example, suggested in *Mambo Leo* in 1945 that female children should be routinely educated as the acquisition of this skill would allow wives to keep in touch with their absent spouses. Literate wives, he argued, 'are a great comfort for men who are away', quick to recall 'distant people' and able to heed 'the instructions of a husband'.[243] Luo migrants in towns across the region similarly sought to control their wives from a distance, bombarding colonial administrators with petitions enlisting their help in their domestic arguments.[244]

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[240] Giblin, *History of the Excluded*, pp.61-2. See also T.M. Kanogo, *African Womanhood in Colonial Kenya, 1900-50* (Oxford, 2005), Ch.4.
[241] Cited in Gulliver, *Labour Migration*, p.39.
[242] *Ibid*, p.40.
[243] *Mambo Leo*, Letter TML. 79801 A. Majatta, April 1945, p.46.
[244] Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism*, pp.128-31.

In the colonial period, women often suffered most severely the hardships of foreign rule. The profits of cash-cropping accrued to men; in labour producing regions it was women who were left at home to carry the wearying burdens of rural subsistence; and the demands of post-war soil conservation campaigns only added to their tasks.[245] Nonetheless, new female opportunities caused men serious worry which was expressed as a moral panic, engulfing the region, over the rise of prostitution.[246] By the 1940s, the conduct of women was the central topic of public comment across East Africa.

Prostitution certainly existed, as migrants to East Africa's towns well knew.[247] At times, indeed, it supported rural accumulation. In the first decade and a half of the twentieth century, for example, prostitutes, Nairobi's African 'pioneers', apparently used their earnings to aid the reconstruction of family herds destroyed by ecological disaster.[248] In the Depression of the 1930s, women from Bukoba, developing a new, more brazen, form, similarly, used sex work as a way of contributing to the recovery of households suffering the costs of the collapse of coffee prices.[249] At other times, prostitution offered an escape route for those lacking rural opportunities, the victims of mistreatment or forced marriage, widows and divorcees.[250] Whatever its precise relationships with rural homes, however, female opportunity spurred worries that far exceeded the reality of the situation.

Employment opportunities in distant towns were a major concern for all men. Away from their fathers and husbands, the virtue of women was suspect. An editorial in the Luo-language newspaper *Ramog*i, for example, made the concern clear, asserting in March 1948 'that… Luo women should be issued with Domestic Identification cards in order to stop young girls coming out

[245] Hunter, 'Languages of Politics', p.127. Lonsdale, 'Anti-Colonial Nationalism', pp.325-6. Bravman, *Making Ethnic Ways*, pp.218-21. J. Iliffe, *The African Poor: A History* (Cambridge, 1987), pp.152-3. Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*, Ch.7.
[246] Berman, 'Palimpsest of Contradictions', p.26.
[247] See Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism*.
[248] White, *Comforts*, pp.28-38.
[249] White, *Comforts*, Ch.5. Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism*, p.158.
[250] White, *Comforts*, p.84, pp.197-8. Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism*, p.159.

as *ayahs*', domestic servants, 'with the aim of encouraging prostitution.'[251] In North Kavirondo, the connection between movement outside the district and immorality was made by missionaries developing a 'Luyia' language in the term '*Achendanga obubi*', meaning 'she is living an evil life', which connected '*obubi*', evil, with the verb '*chenda*', meaning to travel, and which was then taken up by local political associations.[252] Similar suspicions surrounded educated girls, who were routinely portrayed as sexually 'careless'.[253] And the same accusations were levelled, by Africans and British officials alike, at female traders who, from the 1930s, as the anthropologist Louis Leakey observed, began to 'walk into Nairobi from outlying districts and sell potatoes and sugar cane and bananas etc.'[254] In an article published in the Kikuyu-language press, George Ndegwa, later the leader of the Kikuyu Central Association, and Dishon Waihenya, tied this movement to the dangers of prostitution. '[T]rading', they wrote earnestly, 'is a danger to the newly married women, being produce not from their own gardens… Frequently it is the road to the beginning of PROSTITUTION, although the women did not desire it…'[255] In 1929, this fear stood behind popular Kikuyu efforts to defend female circumcision, the guarantor of disciplined female sexuality, from mission attack.[256] And in the 1940s the concern was if anything yet more urgent. In July 1944, the Kiambu LNC was told that 'It had become obvious that much parental control had been lost and even that of husbands over wives', that prostitution was rampant, and that 'if it was felt necessary to take produce to Nairobi this should be done by men and not women', in the interests of depriving women of the opportunity to sell themselves, a task in which the British were only too happy to collude.[257]

The tensions of cash-crop production only added to this moral panic. In Kenya's Central Province, for example, concerns about disciplined female sexuality flourished as the land poor and

[251] KNA, PC/NKU/2/27/34, *Ramogi*, 15th March 1948.
[252] MacArthur, 'Making and Unmaking of African Languages, pp.167-8.
[253] D.W. Cohen and E.S. Atieno-Odhiambo, *Siaya: The Historical Anthropology of an African Landscape* (London, 1989), pp.95-6. Robertson, *Trouble Showed the Way*, p.96.
[254] Robertson, *Trouble Showed the Way*, pp.83-4, pp.92-6. Peterson, 'Writing', pp.84-5. Lonsdale, 'KAU's Cultures', pp.114-5.
[255] Cited in Robertson, *Trouble Showed the Way*, p.95. Original emphasis.
[256] Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', pp.386-95.
[257] KNA, PC/Cent/2/1/13, Minutes of a Meeting of the Kiambu LNC held at Kiambu on 3rd, 4th and 5th July 1944, p.3. Robertson, *Trouble Showed the Way*, Ch.4.

land short found it increasingly hard to establish the family demanded by local standards of a respectable adulthood.[258] And on Kilimanjaro, as coffee boomed, young men, anxious about their ability to acquire land and wives, obsessed over female indiscipline, a metaphor for their haunting fear of social closure.[259] Throughout East Africa, the spectre of female delinquency gripped male imaginations and refused to let go.

[258] Peterson, 'Writing', pp.84-5. D.R. Peterson, 'The Intellectual Lives of Mau Mau Detainees', *Journal of African History*, Vol.49, No.1, (2008), p.86.
[259] Hunter, 'Languages of Politics', pp.130-1.

VI

Across the region, then, by the late 1940s, the world appeared to be, if not turned upside down, then seriously shaken up.[260] Parents found their authority challenged by upstart youths, armed with education or wages; youths and clients found access to an honourable adulthood blocked by the commercial ambitions of their seniors; and all feared the collapse of disciplined female sexuality.[261] Giving expression to this sense of disorder, Charles Sangali complained to the East African Royal Commission about 'the impact of western civilisation, with all its sundry effects upon the African life', and in particular the new 'economic activity' and 'the introduction of money', which had led, he claimed, to a disastrous 'African disintegration'.[262] This was a long way from the transformation envisaged by Eliot half a century earlier. But it was precisely this sense of disintegration that provided both the urgent stimulus to the imaginative labour of community construction and the central threat against which newly imagined communities had to be defended, the subjects of the next chapter.

[260] Lonsdale, 'Jomo Kenyatta', p.38.
[261] Berman, 'Palimpsest of Contradictions', pp.25-6.
[262] BNA, CO 892/10/3, Memorandum from Mr C.A. Sangali, Native Authority Office, Lushoto to the East African Royal Commission, n.d., pp.2-4.